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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to develop a new and
practical technique for improving the art of forecQsting
security price movements. The desire to forecast stock
meTket fluctu~tions hav~ led many analysts to employ
different predicting tools.
It;has been known for some time that a relationship
existe between the paths of th~ economic trend Qnd th@
secul'itie~ markets. The relationship is not hard to
output, employment, and productivity security prices will
rise. The ri~e in security prices is attributed to their
higher value when compared to the earnings and expeceations
of thFir representative firms. This type of analysis which
concerns it~elf with earning$ b~sed on ~Mles, profits and
deb t , @tc. ~ Ls called Fundamental Analysl.s. An examp Le of
yundarneneal Analysi; is presented in Appendix 1. The
exam?l~ is of a firm called FLUOR CORP.; FLUOR is a
corporation ~nga~ed ?rimarily in th~ ~Qnstru~tion of
petroleum facilities. In the Pro!!Jl'~Qt:\.l.~ th Mut::hor l=!I"t.'l ~ntSl
sccnems,e r6Hlt~QniiJ why the demand for petroleum facilities
1
2should rise causing an increase in the demand for FLUOR's
products which ultimately will i.ncrease the price of
FLUOR's shares.
Just as economic and financial analysts try to
predict security movements based on the economic and
financial information of a firm, there are those who try
to forecast movements for all securities based on Funda-
mental Analysis. Such analysts may pay close attention to
Gross National Product changes, or watch the trend of
New Housing Permits, whi.leothers may confine their analysis
to various production figures such as the Labor Aecension
Rate, Plant Utilization Rate, or Inventory to Sales Ratio.
The first section of this paper,"Fundamental
Analysis and Security 1?riceMovements," examines various
tools employed by the Fundamental Analysts to see just
how helpful and accurate following economic trends can
be in predicting security price movements. It will
show tbat often there is a strong disparity between the
course of the nation's business and stock price movements.
This disparity diminishes the forecasting value of the
various economic ata,tis'tics,warranting a better predicting
method.
There is a second major school of economic thought
which ties all economic fluctuatiQns to changes iD the
money supply. This sehool olaims that a rise in the money
st;ook will result in higher idle balances and more
purchasing power which will cause a rise in business
aotivity. This rise in 'bus1n es acrt1v:i.ty :l.a the seueee
for hisher security prices. On the other hand a tishtenins
of the money suPply will slow business activity resulting
in lower eecu~it~ priQes~ ~hose who adhere to this school
of thought eonelude that if ohanges in monetary ~olie,
~.n!luene l:no1s:Llles~ aet1v1 t;y, wh:L@h1~ t\u~\n tt@ct aec\u';L tl
priees, why not bypass the second. step (business aotivity)
monetary policy ..
Dr. !e~l Sprink 1 i9 Vioe.~ sid nt and Eoonem1 t ,
Mel Dir@ctor of i@~ea;rcb tor tlle Har;r1~ 1'ruit &. Sav1l1iB
Bank. His mOf.1eytheory tor foreCulstiq Geeu!'i 'b--y pr:Lces 1m
4esc~ibed in his ~OQk9, Monel an~tOgk PJNlQa~1and llQnez
I
and the MarkS!!.2 Section 2 of this paper presents his
muon l'0csc'8ni5!l9d and eQletlrateCl meneta.I'1 ta.eo~ f@r pZ'ed1@'ti1q
4security prices. After his theory was presented, money
supply data was collected from the past 12 years to see
if a correlation exists between monthly changes in t~e
money stock with movements in the Dow Average. The
Sprinkel theory is then tested in its entirety from
1958 to 1972. The results show that there is a relation-
ship between the trend in money supply growth rates and
the Dow Average. However, the correlation and investment
gains made by the use of Sprinkel's theory are not
sufficient to employ its use.
The third section of my paper presents the "Nebbia
Wolf Pack EnigIllB.." The essence of this section is to
show that there are powerful forces within the market
that cause acute broad swings in the price of individual
shares and the market 8.S a whole. The forces are large
buyers and sellers whose investment behavior is determined
by private information or tips. We will see how a firm
making little if any profits and receiving no recognition
from the investment community, can suddenly have the price
of its shares doubled after being reviewed and recommended
by an advisory firm.
The value of this section cannot be overstated since
it proves that the advice of a few respected individuals
5is enough to send the price of a security into a tail spin
or a sharp climb. 'This advice is not only unavailable to
the average investor, but is passed on to large investors
as a man's wealth would be passed on to his heirs.
The average investor, unaware of these powerful
forces at work within the market, is unable to adjust
his buying and selling tactics. As a result he may often
find his security in a rapid fall (large holders are
selling out) during which there will appear to be no
bottom. On the other hand, his stock may be in a steep
climb, but because he doesn't know who or what is
responsible for the quick rise, he can't make a sound
judgment for a selling price.
Sections 1 through 3 acquaint the reader with
the problems aD average investor faces in trying to make
good investments in the securities market. The purpose
of this paper is not to deplore the use of fundamental
and monetary analysis, rather, it is to show the weaknesses
within these methods that impede the investor from making
successful trades.
In all fairness to the fundamentalists it should
be mentioned that not all their economical and financial
tools were serut:i.niZiCl. An extensive investiS{i):tion 0:£ all
6their tools would be an immense task more appropriate
for a committee rather than an individual. Also,
attempts to get an economical model that would forecast
security prices were continually thwarted by several
banks and investment houses, which j,ndicates that in most
cases such a model does not exist.
As for the final problem caused by the entr~ce and
departure of large investors in the market there is no
model. If an investor is to have a workable model he
must have one which is responsive to economic news while
at the same time allowing him to recognize and deal with
the problems presented by the large block traders and
their analysts.
There is another school of thought which forecasts
security price movements by past and current inve~tors'
actions. This school believes that expectations along
with all economic, financial, psychological, sociological
and other humanistiC traits affect the actions of investors,
both large and small. At any one time any one or any
combination of these factors can determine the trend of
the market. The fundamentalists are hindered by their
inability to measure the effect of expectations and human
psychology in addition to the problems associated with
7accurately interpreting business data, It is a waste of
time trying to measure which factor wj_ll exert the pre-
dominant force when all of the variables are taken into
consideration by all of the investors. These investors
assign weights to the factors and expI'ess their perceptions
by their actions in the market, which are reflected in
security price changes.
An example of this later method. is shown in
Appendix 1. The chart is of FLUOR CORP. and the analysis
is technical because its recommendation and analysis is
based on investors past actions. The chart of FLUOR CORP.
shows where investors entered the market to support the
price of FLUOR above 1~18. Technical Analysts would
conclude that because investors purchased the security
consistently above 17, they would be reluctant to sell
below 17 unless something were drastically wrong with the
company; as a result there is support for the stock at ~8.
On the other hand,an upward resistance level has been
established by investors at 24. At this level, investors
believe that economical and other reasons do not justify
the security selling above 24 for the present.
This type of anlaysis can be applied to the Dow
Jones Industrial Average. However, as one might guess, it
8it is much morA involved. The method is still based on
the fundamental principle that in all cases it is the
investors who determine the value of the Dow Average.
This is done by their actions recorded through price
changes. The price changes can be recorded on charts,
and the charts show patterns which occur time and time
again. By recognizing these recurring patterns, one can
predict the future trend of the market. Section 4 of
this paper presents the theory of Technical Analysis,
and shows how it can be used to forecast trends in the
prices of individual shares and the market as a whole.
Section 5 is an effort to improve Technical
Analysis by recording investors' actions, not only by
price but by volume. In other words, the support that
was attributable to FLUOR CORP. at the 17*-"18 level
should be.measured in both price and volume. Surely it
can be concluded that more support is present if it is
known that one million shares were purchased between 17
and 18 rather than 250,000 shares. When this volume
analysis is applied in conjunction with the basic form of
Technical Analysis presented in Section 4, we see the
results are improved and warrant its use by investors.
CHAPrE_R I
FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS AND SECUBITY PRICE FORECASTING
To most people the thought of making an investment
in the securities market is prompted by the desire for a
good income through dividends and/or swift capital
appreciation. For others, the desire for the return ie
not enough to warrant their investment. To many, an
investment in the stock market is a way to express
nationalism and to partake in the growth of America,
thereby raising the value of tbeir assets as growth occurs.
Those who cannot relate their investment to the expected
growth of the nation, associate it with owning a part
of their ravorite company. They are either fami.liar with
the management of the company or want to participate in
the growth of an advertised product whose quality they
recognize.
The groupS mentioned above represent the purest of
the fundamental investors; their hopes for capital returns
in the market are connected with basic economic reasoning.
There are obviously different levels of economic analysis.
9
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'I'he level referred ~o above, in which a pe rson connects
a. company with a known product, is the simplest level.
There are, however, more complicated and sophisticated
methods employed by well-trained people who try to 1'o1'e-
cast the price of a companyjs shares by using the profits
from a company's sales as an indicator.
When national data on all corporate profits in
the United States is compiled, it is found that there are
periods when the growth of business profits slow or
decrease. The study of these recurring periods of rising
and falling business acti vit;y (and profits) have led manv"
business cycle researchers to look for clues upon which
they could make forecasts about future business conditions.
For example, while trying to predict or identify
a business cycle trough, an economist will rely on data
received from sectors in the economy that generally precede
the entire economy out of the trough. Among these could
be the Average \Jork \Jeek of Production workers. Past
business cycle statistics have shown that the Average Work
Week of the Production Worker bottoms out and increases
before the actual turning point of the whole economy.·3
'Business Conditions Di est, U.S. Department of
Commerce Bureau of the Census, May, 1972), p. ~15.
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Another example would be the use of Corporate
Profits data in predictLng the peak of a business cycle.
Past statistics show that Corporate Profits generally
peak and are declining while the entire economy is still
reaching its peak.4
The above discussion deals with ,just two examples.
Business analysts have many series of data wh1.ch show a
relationship between current bUsiness conditions and fore-
casting future business conditions. The latest and most
sophisticated method of predicting future business con-
ditions from current data employs the lIse of computers
in association with an econometric model. The econo-
metric model assigns weights to different series of
business data based upon their past success in predicting
future business conditiDDs. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, there are many t.ooLa and series of economic data.
This paper does not attempt to sc rut tnt.ze all economic
data and models, but a few of the basic and most widely
used series can be discussed to see of what help economic
analysis can be in predicting the course of the stock
market.
4Ibid., p. 1-:6.
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A major point should be mentioned--most funda-
mentalists who employ economic statistics to predict the
future trend of the business cycle assume that the
securities market will follow the trend of the business
cycle. If there is a correlation between the stock market
and business trends, then the fundamentalists have a case.
However, if it is found that the trend of the nation's
business is not closely associated with the trend of the
market, then of what value can there be in trying to
predict future business trends when it cannot determine
the movements of the securities market.
The cQrrelation between movements in the securities
market and the nation's economy can be examined with the
help of two series of data. The first series, Gross
National Product (constant dollars), was collected from a
twelve-year period starting in May, 1959 to May, 1972.
There are several reasons why the test was restricted to
this twelve-year period.
1. Investors have become more sophisticated. As
a result they would be more sensitive and responsive to
business data than at any other time in the market's
history. All those who believe in Fundamental Analysis
would be more sensitive to economic news, thus tightening
13
the correlation.
2~ GNP statistics are being reported more accurately
and more quickly than at any time before the 1960's.
3. A sample of fifty-three observations presents
more than enough observations to deliver an accurate corre-
lation test. GNP becomes the independent variable which
should determine the Dow Average (dependent variable) if
there is a tight correlation.
Throughout the paper the Dow Average is used to
establish a common scale for measuring changes in security
prices. The uses of the data was prompted by the wide
acceptance given to it by investors. This acceptance is
illustrated by news commentators and security houses'
frequent use of the Dow Average in their daily market
reports. Further indications of its acceptance are seen
in its wide use by various business publications such as
Forbes, Business Week, and Financial World. Furthermore,
all technical analysis is a derivative of the Dow theory
presented by Charles H. Dow in his book, Scientific Stock
Speculation.5 The importance of technical analysis will
5Charles Henry Dow, Scientific Stock Speculation
(New York: The Magazine of Wall Street, 1920).
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be discussed in a later section.
For the correlation test the sample for the Dow
Average was taken during the second week of every month
after the Commerce Department's quarterly report of GNP.
In other words, the recent figure announced for the second
quarter of 1972, ending in June, was announced in the last
week of July- The corresponding sample of the Dow Average
would be taken during the second week of Augu8t~ This
would give investors at least three weeks to adjust the
market to the corresponding GNP figure.
The multiple regression model used to test the
correlation was programmed into the computers by
Walker Reasearch. The following results were achieved
by using the following:
Dependent Variable •••••••Dow Jones Industrial Average
Independent Variable •••••GNP (Constant Dollars 1958)
Observations •.••~••······-53
Time Period •.•••.•• •·••••May 1959 to May 1972
Results
1. Sample Coefficient of Determination or r2~63%
Analysi.§.
The value of the r2 indicates that 63% of the changes in
the Dow Jones Industrial Average are associated with the
changes in GNP (Constant D.ollars). ThuB there remains a
15
unexplained by the regression. A close look at Chart 1
snows that the de~iation from the regression li~e ca~ be
quite large, at times being more than 100 Dow Points.
\Ji.ththis wide dispa.rity an investor's investment, made
within that 3~ margin of error, would suffer a severe
fa.ll in value.
Result
2. Standard Deviation from the Regression~69.30
Analysis
The Standard Deviation from the Regression is a
mea.sure of the closeness of the relationship between GNP
and the Dow A.verage. Thus the smaller the figure is
the closer the Dow Averages are to the regression line
and the more accurate is the regression equation as a
predictive device. A 69 point Dow spread plus or minus
a GNP prediction will never give the most opportune time
to buy or Sill" In easence . what 'Wehave is a 140 Dow
Average spread in which the forecast could fall. This is
extremely large when the mean or the Dow is 796; and the
lowest Dow Average recorded is 585, ruld the highest is
970 in the twelve-year period.
Multiple Correlation and Regression Equation
Involving GNP(constant dollars) and the
Dow Jones Industrial Average
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Result
3. Regression Equation=Dow Average=324.92 t .78363 (b)
Analysis
A forecast using the Regression Equation with the recently
announced Commerce Department figure for GNP in the second
quarter of 1972 yields an extremely accurate figure for the
Dow Average. Dow~324.92 + .78363 (783.1)=938.58. At the
time of this writing the Dow is at 940 which would indicate
an excellent forecast, providing we could have correctly
forecast GaP. However, if we had tried to forecast the
Dow's position in August of 1970 using the then current
GNP data, quite the opposite result would have been
received. The Dow Average in August of 19,(0was 620 but
our forecast gave a different result: Dow=324.92 + .78363
(721.1)=889 ..07. Thus the prediction missed its mark by
269 points. Although this is the largest discrepancy,
Chart 1 shows that smaller but significant discrepancies
are by no means uncommon.
Application for Investment PolicX
The three results achieved by the regression program
in connection wi th the graphic picture presented on Chart 'I
indicates the need to reject the GNP data as a means of
18
predicting security price turning points~ The regression
so does the Dow Average. It is the wide Dow Average
deviation from the regression line tl:1atmakes the use of'
the regression equation so dangerous. Any discrepancy
plus or minus more than ;0 pOinte wO\ll~ exolude the investor
from the market at the most opportune time.
A study of the following data will also show that
even the use of rate of change of GNP data will not reduce
the discrepancy-
DATE DOW AV. GNP
May 1969 to 955 721.4
Aug. 1970 620 721 • /1
Aug. 1970 to 620 72'1.1
Feb. 1971 715 715.9
Nov. 1961 to 715 450.6
Nov. 1962 595 478.)
Aug. 1967 to 91 ? 664.7
Feb. 1972 910 751.3
CHANGE IN-- OOW AV • GN:P
-335 -.3
+95 -5.2
-5 +86.6
The figures definitely show the inconsis"tencies OI
Dow movements witb those of GNP.. In the first periods,
decreases in GNP resulted in increa.ses in the Dow Average,
and in the later two sets of figures increases in GNP resulted
in decreases in the Dow Average.
19
The previous an.a.lysisassumes that we can correctly
forecast GNP. Predicting GNP is a major challenge to all
business firms. With an accurate forecast, manufacturers
can adjust their inventories more closely to sales, provide
themselves with more liquidity for the coming recession,
or increase their capital expenditures for a higher pac e
of business activity. The financial community is also
interested in future bUsiness conditions: bank loans are
easier to obtain duriIlt;rising business conditions and in
addi tion to their own Ileeds, Financial Insti tutions and
Business Schools provide GNP forecasting data on a coo-
sultative basis. Thus much effort and pride are put into
the problems of correctly forecasting GNP.
GNP forecasters are plagued by two large problems.
The first is caused by the government consistently revising
its business statistic!). .P'orexample, the government ha.d
to revise i0S GNP figu~e for the first quarter of 1972
because personal incom~ tax payments were found to be
1.5 billion more than ~xpected. This increase i.n tax
payments caused a. revi~ion in the savings rate from 7.4%
6to 7%, increasing con sumpti.on by 1.5 billion. These
6Survey of Current Business, Bureau of Economic Ana.lysis,
Social and Economic Stg,tistics Administra.tion CU.S. Department
of Commerce, Vol.II. May, 1972), pp , 2-3.
20
government figures are used in econometric models to fore-
cast future GNP. 'When the basic input date is revised,
the forecast must also be revised. The Wharton School of
Business had to lower their estimate of GNP for 1972
(current dollars) from 1,150 billion to 1,142 billion when
the Commerce Department lowered its data for 197'1.7
Imagine the plight of an investor who had invested his money
based on a GNP forecast only to find out later that the
prediction had been revised.
The second problem is caused by the inherent weak-
nesses in the forecasting models themselves. GNP is a
measure of the total output of all the nation's goods
and services. These goods and services are produced by
people. Thus the econometric models have values established
by the past actions of people during particular segments
of a business cycle. But, just as there are no two cycles
exactly alike, neither are humans' actions predictable or
stable, even when environmental conditions remain constant.
An econometric model based on a past consumer savings rate
during a previous recession could come up with an accurate
7Business Week, March 4, '1972, p. 20.
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forecast, whereas a current forecast based on the same
savings behavior during a current recession may be a
false or inaccurate forecast due to a change in the
savings habits of the consumer. The result an econometric
model could assume a savings rate of 7.4% when in actuality
it was 7'&, thus causing a margin of error in the GNP
forecast.8
In conclusion, the problems associated with accurately
predicting GNP (constant dollars) in addition to the
unexplained deviation of the securities markets with the
GNP forecast present a large problem for the investor.
The problem is even compounded for the average investor who
does not have access to econometric models or who does not
understand economiC data.
The major fault with this method is that it relies
on a chain of events that start with the actions of people
in a nation who are influenced by many forces outside of
the business environment. To assume that the chain of events
will flow smoothly from increased business activity to a
higher stock market without interruptions from other forces
assumes too much.
B"Data Revisions, Showing '71 Trailed Estimates, May
Upset '72 Policy," Wall Street Journal, January /17, '1972, p..3.
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GNP is a good measure of current business conditions.
A rising GNP at an annual rate of 30 billion per quarter
(current dollars) compared to the previous fourth quarter
rate of 19.5 billion is an indication that the economy is
rapidly improving; or perhaps, a better way to interpret
the data would be to say the economy had improved steadily
on a quarterly basis. The security trading that takes place
in the light of this second quarter announcement is
obviously reflecting tbe economic advance that occurred in
the first quarter. Since trends and turning points in the
securities markets always precede business cycle movements,
the close correlation is best explained by GNP rising with
a Dow Jones Industrial Average that had bottomed out several
months before the accelerated rate in GNP growth started.
A study of business cycle data shows that that is exactly
what happened in the last economic recovery. GNP (constant
dollars bottomed out in November of 1970, but Standard and
Poors list of 500 stoc,ks bottomed out in June of 1970. In
those five months, the Dow Average would rise from roughly
680 to 760. In short, the Dow Average rose while the state
of the economy, as defined by GNP. was still getting worse.
GNP is an aggregate measure for all of the goods
and services within the various sectors of the economy.
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There are those sectors which precede the movement in ~he
overall economy. For example, spending on hou~ing generally
bottoms out and increases before the overall business
activity of the nation accelerates. If various segments
precede the overall economy then perhaps these segments can
be used as predicting tools for identifying and forecasting
turning points in the securities markets.
The National Bureau of Economic Research, after
careful investigation and testing, has composed a list of
its 12 Leading Indicators which it uses to forecast over-
all economic trends. This list is always reviewed and the
components of it are constantly tested with other series
in order to assure that the most reliable and revealing
indicators comprise the list.
A close look at Chart 2 on the following pages will
show that stock prices are included in this list of 12
Leading Indicators.9 An even closer inspection of the
specific trough dates show that stock prices bottomed out
generally four to five months before the business cycles.
Of the 12 Leading Indicators only two, New Building Permits
9Business Conditions Digest, o~1--t:;-;,p • ..,'15.
CHART 2
SPECIFIC PEAK AND TROUGH DATES
FOR SELECTED CYCLICAL INDICATORS
24
Specific dates are listed under the reference cycle dates to
which they correspond. Numbers in parentheses indicate leads
(_) or lags (+) of specific dates in relation to reference
dates.
12.
10.
29.
31.
23.
Series November 1970 February 961 April 1958
LEADING INDICATORS
'70 (-2)
'70 (-1)
'70 (+1)
'70 (-1)
'70 (-1)
'70(-10)
'70 (-6)
Dec. '60 (-2)
Feb. '61 (0)
Jan. '61 (-1)
Jan. '61 (-1)
May '61 (+3)
Dec. '60 (-2)
Dec. '60 (-2)
Dec. '60 (-2)
Apr. '58 (0)
Apr. '58 (0)
Apr. '58 (0)
Jan. '58 (-3)
Mar. '58 (-1)
Feb. '58 (-2)
Apr. '58 (0)
Apr. '58 (0)
19. St:oCkpt'lces, 500
k J '70 (-5)COnIDlOnstoc s....... une
1. Avg. workweek, prod.
workers, mfg · Sep.
5. Avg. wkly. initial
claims, State unem-
ploy. insur. (inv.) .. Oct.
Index of net business
formation Dec.
6. New orders,durable
good industries ..... Oct.
Contracts and orders,
plant and equipment. Oct.
New bldg. permits,
private housing .... · Jan.
Change mfg. and trade
inventories ... ,..... May
Industrial matls.prices July '71 (+8)
16.
17.
113.
810.
41.
43.
20~.
Oct. '60 (~4) Dec. '57 (-4)
IVQo pora e pro 1 s,after taxes(Q) .... ··
Ratio, price to unit
labor cost, mfg .... ·
Change in consumer
installment debt ....
Compo index of 12
lead. indic.,
reverse trend adj ...
Dec.
Nov.
Oct.
ROUGHLY COINCIDENT INDICATORS
Employees on non-
agricultural pay-
rolls .
Unemployment rate,
total inverted ....
Nov.
Dec.
GNP in current
dollars (Q) . NSC
'70 (0)
'70 (+1)
'70 (0)
'70 (-1)
'70 (0)
IQ '61 (0)
Feb. '61 (0)
Apr. '61 (+2)
Dec. '60 (-2)
Feb. '61 (0)
'61 (+3'70
IVQ '60 (-3)
IQ '58 (- 2)
Apr. '58 (0)
Ma r . '58 (- 1.)
Feb. '58 ( ..2)
May '58 (+1)
(+3), 58
IQ '58 (- 2)
ad
CHART 2 (CONTINUED) i Ii'
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Series
Specific pe~k ~ates.co~res~onding
to contract~ons beglnn~ng ln ---
November 1969 May 1960 July 19"57
LEADING INDICATORS
1. Avg. workweek, prod.
k f 0 '68(-13)war ers, m g ct.
5. Avg. wkly initial
claims, State unem-ploy. 'insur.(inv.) .. Jan. '69(-10)
12. Index of net businessformation Feb. '69 (-9)
6. New orders, durable
d . d' S' 69 (-2)goo ~n ustr~es .... · ep.
10. Contracts and orders,plant and equipment. Jan. '70 (+2)
29. New bldg. permits,private housing ..... Jan. '69(-10)
31. Change, mfg. and trade. '69 (-1)~nventories Oct.
23. Industrial mat1s.
Apr. '59(-13)
Apr. '59(-13)
Apr. '59(-13)
Apr. '59(-13)
Sep. '59 (-8)
Nov. '58(-18)
Dec. '59 (-5)
Nov. '59
Nov. '55(-20)
Sep. '55(-22)
Mar . '5 5 ( - 28)
Aug. '56(-11)
Nov. '56 (-8)
Feb. '55(-29)
Apr. '56(-15)
rices. ............. Feb. '70
19 .
16.
17.
113.
810.
...toc pr~ces,common stocks · Dec. '68
orporate pro ts,after taxes(Q) IVQ '68(-12)
Ratio, price to unitlabor cost, mfg ..... Feb. '69 (-9)
Change in consumerinstallment debt .... Oct. '68(-13)
Camp. index of 12
lead. indic.,reverse trend adj... Sep. '69 (-2)
ROUGHLY COINCIDENT INDICATORS
41.
NSC
IIQ '59(-12)
Apr. '59(-13)
Aug. '59 (-9)
Jan. '60 (-4)
II
Dec. '55
IVQ '55(-20)
Feb. '57 (-5)
Mar. ' 55 ( - 28)
Nov. '56 (-8)
III
* Business Conditions Di est, U.S. Department of Commerce
Bureau ate Econom~c nalysis, May, 1972), p.115
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(29) and Change in Manufacturing and Trade Inventories (31)
preceded the turn around in security prices from the 1969
recession. As for the other two recovery dates, February
1961 and April 1958, none of the NBER 12 Leading Indicators
preceded the turn around in security prices. The question
may be asked, how can an economist know that New Building
Permits (29) and Change in Manufacturing and Trade Inventories
(31) are supposed to precede a market turn around when they
did not do so in the past?
The lead time of these two series also vari~s in
relation to the markets turning points. Manufacturing and
Inventories (31) bottomed out one month before security
prices in 1970 and New Building Permits (29), five months
before. If a person invested on the first decline in
inventories, he most likely entered the market at a good
time. On the other hand, if he invested on the first
improvement in New Building Permi ts (29), he accompani.ed
the rapidly declining value in security prices and missed
the most opportune time to enter the market. Further
complicating the matter, neither of these two series
preceded the market in reaching a trough in 1958 and-196·l.
With this in mind it is probable that they would once
again fail to precede the market in makt.ng a trough.
""
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A study of peak turning points shows that investors
get considerably more warning of eminent security price
peaks than compared to troughs. In July -1957, there were
eight series that peaked out before the market (refer to
Chart 2). When compared to the May 1960 peak in business
activity, we find that there were seven series which peaked
out before the market; the only problem is that several
sets of series changed positions. In 1957 Manufacturing and
Inventories (31), Consumer Installment Debt (113), and
Industrial Material Prices (23) preceded the market peak.
While in May 1960 they lagged the market by five months,
one month and four months respectively. This time, 1960,
there were two new indicators that preceded the market;
New Orders for Durable Goods (6); and Ratio, Price to Uni.t
Labor Cost (17). November 1969 continued the game of
musical chairs. This time three indicators preceded the
market peak, the Average Work Week (1), Corporate Profits
(46), and Change in Consumer Installment Debt ('1'13). The
only two indicators that consistently preceded the market
in reaching a peak were the Average Work Week of Production
Workers (1) and Corporate Profits after Taxes (16). Of
course, the lead time given by each indica.tor varied from
cycle to cycle.
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If each of the indicators individually are of
little help because of their unpredictable lead and lag
relationship with the stock market, then perhaps this
problem can be overcome by using a composite index of the
12 L€ading Indicators. To test the significance of this
index in forecasting security prices, a multiple regression
program similar in nature to the one applied with GNP was
used. The primary difference being the Composite Index of
12 Leading Indicators (reverse trend adjusted) as the
independent variable rather than GNP. To assure accurate
investor response to Commerce Department Composite news
releases the Dow reading was taken within a week of the
release. The result being, that the June Composite of
12 Leading Indicators corresponds with a Dow Average taken
in the first week of Allgust.
The following results were achieved using the following:
Dependent Variable ••••••• Dow Jones Industrial Average
Independent Variable ••••• Composite of 12 Leading Indicators
Observations ••.•••.•.•••• 148
Time Period ••••••••..•••• March 1960 to June 1972
Results
1• 2Sample of Coefficient of Determination=r =49.8%
2. Standard Deviation from the Regression:-.:80.34
Regression Equi3.tion=Dow AV'erage:::ll-58.04+ ).67296 x B
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Analysis
The value of r2 indicates that 49.6% of the changes in
the Dow Jones Industrial A.verage are associated with changes
in the 12 Leading Indicators. There remains a 51.4% vari-
ability in movement of the Dow Average that is unexplained
by the regression. In addition to this there is a. standard
deviation from the regression of T or - 80 ..34 Dow points.
Despite the timing of the samples with the news releases
a highly predictable correlation was not achieved. The
use of the regression equation is even less desirable than
the one obtained using GNP as the determining factor. The
results are not surprising when compared with the data of
individual leading series. None of the peak or trough
reference dates for stock prices were preceded by a change
in the composite of the 12 Leading Indicators.
Application for Investment Policy
The results achieved in the regression program shows
that there is little correlation between movements in the
12 Leading Indicators and the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
It would appear that the ability of the 12 Lead.ing Indicators
in preceding market turnjng points is diminished by their
inability to do eo consistently and evenly. Further
30
complicating the analysis is the lag that several of the
series have in relation to Dow Average turning points~
Their lag cancels out the lead of a few of the 12 Leading
Indioa.tors..thus renderin@ the composite useless as a
market forecasting tool.
Another factor which diminshes the use of leading
economic series analysis is recognizing turning point signals.
It was seen earlier that in each cycle the individual series
altered its trend in a different lead-lag relationship with
the market. If it is assumed that an eminent market peak
is signaled by a two month fall in the Average Work Week
of Production Workers (1) and Corporate Profits (16);
then we make ourselves vulnerable to false signals. After
two monthly declines either one or both of the series may
recover, or perhaps they both might remain strong while
the Change in Consumer Installment Debt (1~3) and New Orders
for Durable Goods (6) deteriorates. Under these circum-
stances, an investor would become thoroughly perplexed over
when and what position to take in the market.
In addition to the problem of recognizing turning
signals by the indicators, there is also the difficulty
caused by the divergent movement of the 12 Leading Indi-
cators with the economy. For example, in 1962 the 12
31
Leading Indicators declined, but the economy leveled off
and later resumed its upward climbe This disparity be~een
the two would diminish the value of using economic series
analysis to forecast overall trends in the economy as well
as security prices. This later problem is exemplified by
the recent comment made by Assistant Commerce Secretary,
Harold C. Passer, that the list of 12 Leading Indicators
must not be adhered to presently because it rises less
rapidly or levels off after the initial stage of the
economic recovery. (Appendix B)10
~ith these problems in mind of how much value are
economic statistics in forecasting security price movements?
Julius and Shiskin, a statistician and economist, have done
much to improve the economic indicator approach:
The difficulties of using the indicators (economic)
are formidable. In interpreting current changes
we are sometimes confronted with false signals,
pauses in the underlying trend, variability in
the performance of our most trusted serip.s, shifts
in.B.ttitudes arising from external events, and
errors of measurement.11
10"Leading Indicator Slowdown Wouldn't Suggest Slump,"
Dow Jones Teletype, July 6, 1972.
11Julius Shiskln, "Business Cycle Indicators: The Known
and the Unknown," Business Cycle Developments, September, 196.3,
p , 75.
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Beryl Sprinkel, another nota.ble economist who has done much
research in trying to forece-at market prices colmnents:
Yet many analysts base their views of future
stock prices on short-run business forecasts.
It is no wonder that these forecasts seldom
detect stock price turning points and usually
are right only when present price trends are
continued into the. future. Stnce the most
probable price trend, in the absence of over-
whelming evidence to the contrary, is that
p~Qe6 will continue in the same direction, it
is possible with such forecasts to be right most
of the time. However, the misses will occur at
the very time accuracy is wortb a grea.t d.eal of
money, namely, at the turning points of the stock
market. '12
He concludes,
In fact, they are likely (economic statistics)
to be completely misleading at those pOints
where the direction of stock price movements
is the opposite of the business trend."5
In summary, although security prices generally rise
and fall in connection with the increasing or decreasing
health of the economy, the economy or aspects of it canno r
be used to predict stock prices with any accuracy. It
would be unwise to say that an economist is not better
equipped than an average investor for making prudent invest-
ment decisions, but, judging from the extent of the help he
12Sery1 Sprinkel, Money and Stock Prices (HomeWOOd,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Tnc ; , 4961+), p •. "1~1'7.
13Ibi.d.
receives from his economic tools, he is entitled to his
share of mistfikes.
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CHAP.rER 2
SPRINKEL! S MONETARY APPROACH TO
SECURITY PRICE MOVEMENTS
Beryl Sprinkel is a leading critic of the school of
fundamental analysis. In order to predict gyrations in
the stock market, Sprinkel wanted to develop a more precise
indicator. Sprinkel's quest led him into monetary research.
In 1964- he published, Money and Stock Prices.
14
This book.
1t:
has recently been up-dated with Money and the Markets. '/
In both Sprinkel presents his thesis.
The Federal Reserve, with its three broad powers
for altering the money supply, can influence the desire of
businesses and individuals to hold idle cash or to obtain
goods and services. The willingness of individuals and
businesses to hold cash depends upon the level of foregone
return or satisfaction that could have been derived through
currency exchange for other assets. Sprinkel fails to
mention expectations. At any point in time individuals
'14Beryl Sprinkel, Money and Stock Prices (Homewood,
IllinoiS, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964).
15Beryl Sprinkel, Money an~ the Markete(Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 19'71).
31+
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and businesses will have an optimum distribution of
monetary and non-monetary assets. When larger idle
balances quickly result due to an expansive monetary policy,
holders of idle balances convert their money into assets
or goods, bidding up the prices of assets or goods as
demand increases relative to the supply of all desired assets
both tangible and intangible. This increased desire for
goods and services is later displayed by higher GNP figures.
From tbis foundation Sprinkel claims that changes
in the money supply, defined as demand depos:i.ts plus
currency in circulation, influence business conditions and
thus precede the general economic fluctuation. To support
this postulate, several charts were provided in his book
showing the trend of GNP Velocity (Current GNP + Average
Stock of Money) relative to an annual rate of monthly money
supply change put on a six month moving average. Sprinkel's
data (Chart 3) showed that:
1•
All businesS declines since 19~8 were preceded
by a reduction in the rate of monetary growth.
2. Recoveries since 1918 were consistently precededby a rise in the rate of monetary growth.
Evidence indicates that the intensity of the change
in monetary growth is directly related to the rate
of change in the economy.
At this pOint, Sprinkel has not provided anything but
CHART 3
MONETARY GROWTH, VELOCITY, AND BUSINESS FLUCTUATIONS
( 1I\l1! J I
\ I <I ... f. r.\ 11' (; H (I .... J J J, \ J.I '" , 1 ,. ,,, p II t ,\" I.~' 1·\, "1
'i
r
u
~~~. "-
RATE Of CHANGE IN MONtY STOCK ·r.····
'. \~ .. '.
C·,
20~'\J-',.-
1:) i ~
I
10: .
'__ ,
r
.,," I '-If)
I ~I"
Lll 1',,1)',,1:' r. (' }'I·d, I,d Hf'';!'I\'1 f\",Hd, ',1111111,,1 ""f",111 ·01 I, ',1".;')" Hf'~1 ,IT, L 1,)[
i), "'oIill! ""t-. "dl""{,,,1 I IJrI"I), \ \ 'i"lI.\Pll,dh ..dlll"ll·1I I
I \1,1", ,I r.d, ,.I ;1l"I1!1,:\ \ h.III~( vrx 1I;"rilh fllIJI.'IIl\.( ,'I'\'r.H;I'
'. '" .11.. \ .l.,t,', !" (", I' II) ~), q 1,.11 Ir" h ..,{III" I ','J j()
....", " : I.J' I ,,,ti,, ,III' I r I J IH I ~ III 1,11""" ..... ,II -trv I!'
Ii ,', ,I L,,'lo:I' d.ll I i,'ll,r', '\'.~LI·.! J Iii';} ,In \. ,'" ,I 'H. i~"JIII'\ ...r,ll k -,,'111' ,1\ 011\.,1,11' 1'1 I ,,- "1(01',.
",' /I •.. III li)Jl/,fl'l
I'", r 1 ; ,r, ",'r,', ,I ;" :\ 1'1 ,'1'1 'I", "I") 11
1,'1
37
a leading economic ind.icator, although he has a reliable
record of preceding broad economic movements. For his
theory to be beneficial as a predictor, it must lead
the market as well.
Next, Sprinkel presents a chart (Chart l.j) showing
the trend of Standard and POOl'S 500 Stock Average with
the trend of the money growth rate on a six month moving
average. The chart includes the period from 1918 to
1963.
To test the predictive power of the monetary growth
series, Sprinkel's buy and sell signs were added:
1. Fifteen months after the monetary growth series
peaks, a bear market will begin.
2. Two months after the monetary growth series
bottoms out, a bull market will begin.
Sprinkel, upon cOIDIllentingupon the disparity between
the signs given by his money indicator and the trends of
the market, claims that there a.re times when the market is
under the influence of other than economic forces. This,
of course, adds to the difficulty. Perhaps that is whnt
occurred in 1962 when security prices took a sudden tail
spin with absolutely no warning from the six month money
growth indicator. In its entirety, Sprinkel claims his
method forecasted a coming bear market when stock prices
CHART 4
LIQUIDITY CHANGES AND STOCK PRICES
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were wi thin 8.1% of stocl<market peaks. 'l'hebull market
signals were given within 8.6% of stock market troughs.
Despite this good percentage Sprinkel himself admits
that it's easy to assign peaks and highs to a trend when
looking backward.
It should be recognized that peaks and troughs
in monetary growth were selected in hindsight
and that favorable and unfavorable liquidity
periods for stock prices were accordingly
determined by tnose selections. Hindsight
selection is alwaJs easier than foresight decision
making. 16
The biggest fault of Sprinkel's method of price
forecasting lies in the short lead time of two months i.n
predicting security trough dates. E'or example, in late
1956 and early 1957 the rate of change in money stock
increased for several months, yet the market was still
in a bear market trend. 'fhis problem increases when one
receives current monetary data one month late. It is
conceivable in these circumstances that more than a two
month lag would be necessary before a decision could be
made. Under these circumstances ODe might find himself
19Money and Stock Prices, op.cit., p. ~34.
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trying to anticipate a change in monetary policy_
In order to find out just how effective Sprinkel's
theory is in forecasting security price movements, two
tests were applied. The first was to run a multiple
regression correlation test to see if any interrelation
exists between stock price movements and money supply
increases or decreases. In selecting the data money supply
information was given a one month lag to allow investors
to react to the newly released monetary data. The second
test would be the actual test of the Sprinkel theory
using his buy and sell signs'as he described them..
The multiple regression model used to test the
correlation was programmed into the computers by Walker
Research. The following results were achieved by using
the following:
Dependent Variable ••••••• Dow Jones Industrial Average
Independe.n,t Variable •••••Money Supply (Demand Deposits
Plus Currency in Circulation)
Six Month Moving Average
Observations •••••.••••.• •155
Time Period ••••.•••••••• ·February 1959 to May 1972
Results
1. Sample Coefficient of Determination or r2.o:48%
2. Standard Deviation of the Regression~82.65
3. Regression Equation-:.:DowAverage:.:689.7-1...28.71765 x B
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Analysi.s
The value of the r2 indicates that 48% of the changes
in the Dow Jones In4ustrial Average associated with changes
in GNP (constant dollars). Thus, there remains a 52.1
variabili ty in the movement in the Dow Ave r-ag e that is
unexplained by the regression. The standard deviation of
the regression is appreciably larger than that received
on our first correlation test using GNP as the independent
variable. It should go without saying that the latest
regression equation is even less dependable than the first
two derived (Section 1).
Application fOr Investment Policy
The wide disparity between movements in the money
supply's six month moving average with that of the Dow
J.:)nesIndustrial Average 8ives little assistance, if any
at all, in trying to forecast security price movements.
At this stage we would rel1ect money supply changes as a
sign of eminent security ~rice changes.
The second test is a test of the Sprinkel theory.
Data for a six month moving average (Demand Deposits +
Average Supply of Currenc,) was collected and a moving series
constructed. The moving average figure was given a one month
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lag in order to give a potential investor time to get recent
data, maintain his series, and make a decision. The six
month moving average figure for April thus appears as that
for May. The data for the test are provided in Chart 5.
The buy and sell signs as given by Sprinkel are
repeated here:
1. Fifteen months after the monetary growth rate
peaks a bear market will begin. In other words,
unless a faster rate of monetary growth appears
within 15 months of a recent high, a sell sign
is givEID.
2. Two months after tbe monetary growth figure bottoms
out, a market buy sign is given, indicating that
a bull market is about to begin.
The data shows a trough was reached in the six month
moving indicator at -3.22. This data was put together in
June 1960, and at that timE the Dow Average was at 630.
Sprinkel's own chart shows the series bottoming out in
May 1960. Thus, a bull market was due to start in July,
with investors finding that out in August, when tbe Dow
Average was at 620. As carlbe sueu, a more opportune
buying time appeared, especially between October and
December of that year. 1961 generally kept the inVestors'
heads above water, but their situation was hardly what
one would expect in the early stages of a bull market.
The year 1962 brought them down to the break even line with
1959
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615
630
650660
645
645
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- 3.36
.... .-,r
).)0
3.3(;
1.68
3.36
1.68
4.20
-4.20
O.uO
-3.36
-1 .68
J • 1 2
.28
- .56
2.80 "
2.9;1
685 -5. ,'33 -1 .E~2
620 -1 .68 -2.80
615 - 3.36 -2.66
630 -3.36 _) .22->4-·
600 -1 • [):J -2.9Lt
630
,...... ,-. ,~
-).)0 -3.22
635 -3.36 -2.80
620 2.52 2.1J
625 4.32 - .82
585 .84 - .12
535 .84 .30
595 -1.68 .58
620 3.36 1 .70
655 1.68 1 ,-,.'.':)0
665 .....7 .-~.- 1 .40;;.)0
685 3.36 1 .82
690' 2.52 2.1 J
705 2.52 2.[30
695 0.00 2.24
715 .84 2. h)
730 O.Ou 1 • ~J~.
71'0 5.04 1 .<J2
715 5.83 2.38
720 5.88 2.94
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J _!_\.I; • ?20 6.60 Lj • () I.f·
Ii'i:;1) • 705 0.00 3.S0
.:,:';:J1. 720 1 .68 4.1 ij
705 2.52 3.76
l,'~J',_Y 665 3.2!~ 3.32
JU~V;J~ 595 -2.40 1 .94-
JU.)Y 585 0.84 .98
icuG. 600 -0.84- • (J4
S :=;~p.~' • 600 -0.84 .42
Ge'l' • 590 -1 .68 -.2(j
lITUV • 595 4.08 - .14
DEC. 655 5.76 1 .22
'lq€2_
;;.!;..Y_.
JAlY. 660 4.92 2.18
]?Ej3. 680 4.08 2.72
~<i;_It• 660 4.92 3.68
A }1:~. 690 1 .56 4.22
s., :.L,Y 720 4.08 4.35
JlJhJ;; 730 3.24· 3.i30
JJ_,)y 700 3.96 :3 • SLlr
AUG. 705 6.36 4.02
0BPJ: • 730 2.t,·0 3.60
01"'11') 750 2.40 3.74'-'.L.
l;':N. 7ir3 5.52 3.98
DEC. 755 7.08 4.62
1964
JUT. 770 -0.84 3.82
}':1~13• 790 3.96 3.42
~, ~ ,'-1 --) 805 :3 • 12 3.:A..........ll.. •
APB.• 825 0.72 3.26
,·.Y 830 3.12 2.80
J Ul'~'~~ 815 3.84 2 7.')• ..JL..
JULY 835 4.68 3.2Llr
AUG. 835 7.68 3.86
c ,',1 if I' 845 4.56 4.1 G,~).U .~ ...l. •
OU'i' • 880 7.68 5.26
l'[I,v • 885 4.56 5.5\)
D.DC. 875 1.56 5.12
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1962
Jr. 'T 880 5.2/3 5.22.1 .... ..1 ...
1;1,.._:~.JJ • 905 O.GO 3.94
.·.j\.I~• 890 0.72 3.30
t.: . 905 3.72 2.6/1-
j~Y 925 5.28 2.76
Jm;E 905 -2.28 2 .'I 2
JU~Y 870 7.44 2 •~.(~
LUG. 885 5.16 3 . ~~.;
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no warning of still lower prtces to come. The following
years, 1961 through 1966, brought a steady but gradual rise.
The money rate growth indicator peaked out at 7 ..26 Ln
March 1966 as the 15 months that followed did not show a
faster growth rate. The sell signal was thus given in June
1967 at the Dow 850 level, Siving the investor a 230 point
gain on the Dow Average. A closer look shows that he almost
sold out at the low for the year. What is more discouraging
is that a new buy sign waS given in August 1967 with the
second consecutive monthly increase in the money rate indi-
cator, thus he had to buy back into the market at a higher
level, 915 to be precise.
What was not known was that the money rate indicator
was reaching a peak and wouLd peak out in November 1967
(actually October 1967) and a new sell sign was given in
February 1969 at 950. Thus another 35 Dow points were
made. This sell signal was to prove to be the best signal
in the twelve-year period. Chart 5 shows the investor
sold out at 950 just as the market got ready to go into a
tail spin of over 300 points. A new buy sign was given in
March 1970 at; the Dow 780 (two consecuti ve higher rates of
monetary growth).
Unfortunately, the Dow Average had not bottomed out,
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as a matter of fact it had another 160 points to fall.
In spite of missing the turning point by a large margin,
to this date the chart shows the investor roughly 130
points ahead. At this time, it appears as if the
monetary growth rate has peaked at 10.99 (six month
moving average) on August 1971. However, seven months
remain to top that average and it appears that average
will go up rather than decline in the near future.
Summary of Trades
March 1960 SOLD
August 1960 BOUGHT
June 1967 SOLD
August 1967 BOUGHT
February "'969 SOLD
March 1970 BOUGHT
July 1972 SOLD
DOW615
DOW' 620
DOW 850
DOW 9'15
DO\J 950
DOW 780
gain 230
gain", 35
DOW 920 total gain = 265 pts.
Sprinkel's theory has thus provided us with a gain of
265 Dow points over a twelve-year period. Which is a
gain of approximately 22 Dow points every year. Its major
handicap, as mentioned before, is in putting the investor
into the market at the proper or most opportune ti.me.
In August 1960, the t.ndi.ca tor ~a8 several months early,
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and when a better buying opportunity developed in 1962,
a time when an investor could have at least increased
his holdings of securities, the moving average was acting
extremely weak. The buy in August 1967 came late. The
best buying opportunity occurred in the latter part of
1966 and early 1967. The buy in March 1970 was also early.
The sell signs with a better record also have much
room for improvement. The sell in March 1960 at the Dow
615 accomplished little more than putting the investor
baCk into the market at a higher price two months later
at 620. The sell in June 1967 did the same, only forcing
the investor to pay a price to get back into the market,
60 points more. The warning of the coming bear market
in 1969 proved to be the best signal.
The performance of this method over the past ten
years would lead me to reject this method or at the least
use it in conjunction with another. When one considers
that the Dow Average moved from the Dow Average of 575
in November 1962 to a DoW Average of 975 in February
1966 with little if anY downward movement at all in the
four years (eee DoW chartS), the peak showing a 265
pOint gain over five years is the least that a much publi-
cized theory should earn.
1.1
I
/
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Sprinkel's theory is based on the premise that
changes in the monetary growth rate affect stock prices.
The charts provided in his book, in addition to the
multiple regression run, would support a conviction that
the two are interrelated. But to predict troughs and
peaks in the market requires an extremely tight correl-
ation. This tightness as shown through the regression
program is not present.
There also appears to be other problems inherent
in the thesis. Are we to assume that the Federal Reserve
will take steps of equal compulsion in pulling the nation
out of a recession or in stopping a rapid growth of
,
inflation? It should appear as obvious that some
business recessions are of longer duration and more
damaging to economic growth th~l others. Surely, the
Federal Reserve will apply a more monetarily aggressive
policy in dire times. Sprinkel's theory makes no mention
of the insistent aggressiveness of the Federal Reserve to
influence the economy. It would appear that the more
pronounced the Federal Reserve policy the greater its
ultimate affect should be on the securities ma.rket-s, Yet
Sprinkp,l treats all counter cycle maneuvers by the Federal
Reserve as equal--lltwomonths after the growth in the money
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supply bottoms out a bul'l market will begin.
The Sprinkel theory is also based on the premise
that enlarged demand deposits and currency will find
their way into the market resulting in higher stock prices.
A rise in demand deposits at the tail end of a recession
could be an indication of higher caution by individuals
and b,lsinesses• Future expectations always look bla,ckest
at the trough of a business decline. Demand deposits under
,these circumstances would be increased by individuals as
a h~dge against continuing economic deterioration. With
a pessimistic view of the future, much of the demand
deposits that could have been channeled into the securities
market might have found their way to the sav:i.ngsaccount
instead. A look at the trend of individual personal
savings ('lIable1) shows savings indeed increased,
especially at the time of the market trough.
An article carried in the Wall Street Journal titled
"Money in the Tillll shOWS how businesses reacted to the
depressed era.
Business analysts were openly wondering whether
the financia,l collapse of the cash-starved Penn
Central Transportation Co. would be merely th~
opening round in a series of major bankruptcies.17
1711Money in the Till," \Jail Street Journal, October 22,
1970, p , 13·
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TABLE 1
PERSONAL SAVINGS TREND
ANNUAL RATE IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
£ersona1 Savings Change Eer Quarter
1969
1st Qtr. 32.8
2nd " 33.4 +1. 63rd " 42.3 +8.94th " 43.1 + .8
1970
1st Qtr. 46.2 +3.1
2nd " 54.2 +8.03rd " 57.4 +3.24th " 58.5 +1.1
1971
1st Qtr. 58.6 + .1
2nd " 63.6 +5.03rd " 61.0 -2.64th " 59.0 -2.0
1972
1st Qtro 56.5 -2.5
RATIO OF PERSONAL SAVINGS TO DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME
1969 1970 1971
1st Qtr. .056 1st Qtr. .069 1st Qtr. .081
2nd " .053 2nd " .079 2nd " .0863rd II .065 3rd " .082 3rd fl .081
4th " .063 4th " .083 4th " .078
"'(BusinessCotldi,t'ionsDigest, U.S. Department of
Corrrrnerce(Bureau of the Census, April, 1972), Pp. 72, 96.
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The main theme of the article carries the connotation
that corporations dismayed over the trend of economic
circumstances tried hard to increase their cash balances
and reduce short term debt. Manufacturing firms
generally are not large investors in the stock market.
But it should not be hard to see how the consternation
expressed by these firms could leak to other industries,
like the insurance, savings and loan, and banking
industries which are major participants in the securities
markets.
In summary, it would appear that the problem stems
from the rigid steps of occurrences that must take place
before Federal Reserve policy results in security price
changes. To accept the theory that stock prices will turn
down within 12 to 15 months (spotting Sprinkel a three month
spread) after monetary growth has peaked, assumes that
monetary forces will take 12 to 15 months to reduce demand
deposits and currency, causing a liquidity crisis, and
finally forcing investors (business and private) to
reduce stock holdings. With this lengthy chain of events,
no wonder we were wide of our mark entering and leaving
the market. It appears to the author that a prerequisite
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for B good investm~nt tool would be a tighter correlation
between movements in the market and actions taken by
tnvestors, thus shortening the time and chain of events ..
.'t
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•
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CHAPrER 3
THE 1.JOLF.' PACK ENIGMA
This section of the paper deals with a major
investment problem. The problem is a by-product of
economic analysis or, to be more precise, economic
information. This problem will be referred to as f1frhe
Wolf Pack Enigma." The problem is postulated on the
premise that a man's decision is only as good as his
information. Economic or business information is not
available to every investor. In bis quest for knowledge
of corporate information, an investor generally receives
a quarterly report and an annual report on the corporation.
Yet analysts of private investment firms and those repre-
senting large clients are permitted personal interviews
with the corpora.te presidents and other corporate
executives. These analysts receive ec()nomic information
. 18first-hand, long before it reaches the publ1.c. Thus,
18Barry Newman, "Analysts' Closed Talks with J:i'irms
Are Called Unfair by the Press," Wall Street Journal,
March 31,1972, p. 1.
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all those who are represented by the a.nalyst receive
investment informa.tion first and buy the security fir-st,
thus raising the price for other potential investors.
The example (Appendix C) concerns an investment
analyst for OPPENHEIMER & CO., Mr. Bert Fingerhut.
Fingerhut is an authority on airline issues, and, although
the article does not mention his interviews with airline
executives (which are not illegal) , it is certain tha.t ts
how he keeps his information current and accurate.
Fingerhut made the newS after a series of complaints were
registered by mutual fund clients of his. It appears that
OPP.ENH:EIMER fund sold a huge block of AMERICAN AIRLINES,
then a few days later Fingerhut lowered his recommendation
on th' 19e a~rline •.
From this set of facts one can reasonably conclude
that the OPPENHEIMER fund probably bought into AMERICAN
AI:RLlNES before other mutual funds and average investors
did. The examples of this type of chain of events are
endless. Just to add one other, Appendix D contains an
article dealing with another advisory service, the Value
Line Service. Their analyst, Hillson, interviewed a firm
19
Dan
Dorfman, "Heard on the Street, ,1 Wall Street
Journal, June 20, 1972, p. 43~
58
named SOLID S'rATE SCIENTIFIC. Before his recornmf-,mdation was
printed and sent to subscribers, he purchased some of the
stock (most likely so did some of his close friends or
relatives), at less than 1; a share, thus altering ttH?
price before the report was issued. Within a week after
Hillson's recommendation became public the security was
selling for 21.20
A similar experience occurred concerning another
Value Line recommendation, OEMONT DHUG & CHEMICAL. 'llhe
week before the recommendation became public the price of
the security rose from 12 to 13~. \oIithina week of the
recommendation the stock was selling for 20 (clostng at a
high for the year of 19). \oIithina month it would be
selling for 10~t within three months it would sell for
~.21
lJhat is the essence of all this information? The
information cited in this section is an example of powerful
forces exerting their power on the price of different
seourity shares. The power is derived from the purchase
20Dan Dorfman, "Heard on the Street," Wall Street
Journal, July 7, 1972, p. 33.
21Value Line Selection and Opini.on, New York, Arnold
Bernhard and Co., Inc., March 19,1971•
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and sale of strong investment groups seeking profits. 'I'he
profi ts are based on economic informa.tion tha,tis not
a.vailable to all investors as a whole. Thus there are
powerful currents in the market whipping the price of
an investor's security about. Had a holder of ORMONT
CHEMICAL known that it was an advisory service that had
momentarily inflated the price of his security to a
PIE ratio of -90, he might have sold it immediately
instead of following the price down.
If forces such as these affect individual securities
then they must affect the market as a whole.
Instead of financiel analysts inflating and
collapsing security prices individually, imagine respected
economists with large mutual fund, bank, etc. following.
A sell recommendation at the top of a market peak might
have caused the peak. If the thought of one economist
causing a peak is hard to swallow, then say two or ten,
the number is unimportant. What is important is that
the average investor is caught in a market tail spin
because someone forgot to pass him the information, or
maybe he is sUPR9s,d to end up holding the bag.
The Wolf Pack Enigma as based upon the preceding
discussion starts with the leaders of the pack (investment
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adv'isory firms). In tb.eirquest for sheep (profits), they
are constantly checking out farmer Jones' farm. (economy)
to see if there are any good healthy sheep to be had.
Upon finding a heal thy farm.,the wolves must make sure
farmer Jones (Federal Reserve or Fiscal Policy in line
for the purchase of securities) is asleep. Upon reaching
the conlcusion that his farm is rea.dyfor a raid, the
wolves attack, with the leader and his few respected friends
choosing the sheep to kill. The last ones to get to the
food sxe the smaller, weaker wolves (inmost cases the
private investors). These later wolves are left with the
scraps, if that, because the big wolves had already
picked out the best (got into the security early) and
taken them (profits). The strong wolves, properly
nourished, are the first to leave at the sound of trouble.
The smaller and weaker wolves, driven by a hunger, never hear
farmer Jones coming (change in monetary or fiscal policy)---
BANGl
One of the leading tecbnical indicators used for
predicting market trendS and holding a formidable record
of accuracy is the odd-lot sales ratiO. When the odd-lotter
(small investor) is buying on balance, a bear market will
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soon follow. When he sells on balance, the bull is just
22around the corner.
22Robert D. Edwards, Technical Analysis of Stock Trends
(Springfield, Mass: John Magee, 1958).
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cooummary
The first three chapters of this paper were intended
to acquaint the reader with the problems of investing
accurately in the securities markets. III trying to enter
and leave the market at the most opportune times a good
investor will look for anv tool that mev aid him. Th""W ........, • e use
of fundamental and monetary analysis based upon business and
tinancial statistics will not give the investor the razor's
edge over his competitors. But that does not mean that
they should be discarded. On the contrary. a correlation
does exist between the securities markets and the economy,
but the correlation is not tight enough nor the signals
clear enough for an investor to feel secure in taking
decisive action. It's as if the business world was four
high walls pinning within those walls a bull and a bear.
But alas the area within those walls is too large to
predict the location of either animal with any degree of
accuracy.
The problem presented in Chapter 3 adds further
distortion to the securities markets. The sharp price
fluctuations caused by the entrance and departure of
large traders adds another unknown for the investor to
shoulder. Besides trying to attach economic significance
6')._)
to these sharp price moves, be must also pred:i.ctthe
future intentions of these big traders if he is to
survive ..
The major weakness of fundamental methods lay in
their dependency on a long chain of events, that start in
some sector of the economy or business world and flow
through an endless universe of forces and influences before
finally achieving the desired result. To increase invest-
ment results, it is necessary to shorten the chain of
events, in this way limiting the factors that can alter
the prognostication.
The following chapter is a step in that direction
as it is concerned with the analysis of investors' moves,
not their motives.
GliAPl'ER 4
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND SECURITY PRICE MOVEMENTS
The validity of any technical method used to predict
stock market move$ents hinges on its ability to show the
influence of the conflicting forces of supply and demand
on a particular stock groUP ot securities (Dow Jones
Industrial Average). When demand for a particular stock
rises, the price of the stock goes up; when the forces of
supply are greater than those of demand, the price falls.
There are three primarY ways to graphically repre-
sent this conflict: line charts, bar charts, and point-and-
figure charts. On both line and bar charts the horizontal
axis represents time (days, weeks, or months) and the
vertl.cal axis represents price. On the line chart the
closing prices of a stock on successive days Bre connected
by a line. On the bar chart vertical lines (bars) are
drawn for each tise period, with the top and bottom of
each har plotted at the high and loW prices for the period.?3
23Jerome B. Cohen and Edward D. Zinbarg, Investment
Anal sis and Portfolio Mana ement (N.Y.: DoW Jones-Irwin,
Inc., 1969 , p. 522.
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]'01' the purposes of this analysis, the poi.nt-·and-.
figure method will be used. 'Whilethis method i.nits
entirety can be fairly complex, the reader will be exposed
to only the essentia.l elements of its composition. 'I'he
goal of this study is not to scrutinize the merits of
the point-and-figure method, but rather to examine the
basic technical indicators themselves as a means of
communication.
The point-and-figure chart consists of the following
elements: (1) a vertical column of X's (going up) denoting
that demand is stronger than supply (Chart ;111 of COMPUTING
& SOFTWEAR CORP.); (2) a vertical column of O's (going
down) indicating that supply is stronger than demand, and
(3) an interpretation of the price movement on these
vertical columns. Chart 1A portrays the conflict between
the forces of supply and demand reflecting the conti.nuous
changes in the price of the stock of COMPU'l'ING& SOFTWEAR
CORP. The numbers in the vertical columns denote months,
with 1 referring to January and 12 to December. The
stock is charted on its high or low depending on its trend.
In an up move, each succeeding new high reached by the
stock is marked with XiS on the square that represents the
new price. For example, in September 196'7COM.PUTING&
~~-"--"-'''''_~--r
.,- .. _. ~ ...-- ~
r :~:- :~ij
---.-~--'-'---' - i'-~---
.--~-. -j. . .l
I
w.J
v"')
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SOFTWEAR CORP ..reacbed successive new highs starting with
17 in September and reaching.24 in October. A tl. bnr-e e ox
reversal i.s required to initiate a downtrend adding O's
as new lows are reached. To continue with the example,
after reaching a high of 24 the stock hit a low of 2'1.
From 21 on new loWS were plotted until the stock reached
20 (November). To get back to X's, a three box reversal
is required (on the upside). Sometime in November
COMPU'rING & SOFTWEAR CORP. bounced off its low of 20 and
, l~
hit 2~ ../ per share, thus once again requlrlng the use of
24
X's to record the upward movement.
The purpose of the three box reversal is to
eliminate minor and insignificant price changes. Prices
between 0-5 pe~ share require a 75¢ drop in value (each
square is worth 25¢ froro0-5) before we change from XiS to
O's. Between 55 and $20 per share we require a $1.50 drop
in the price of the security because each square is now
worth 5O¢; and finally for prices above $20, a $3 drop is
required because each square is worth a $1. The reasoning
behind this is that higher priced stocks generally have a
24Chart of COMPUTING & SOFTWEAR CORP. received from
CHARTCRAFT , INC., Larchmont, New York, 1972.
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br-oade r training range in any particular day th811 the
lower priced securities .. The important thing to remember
is that it always requires three boxes in the opposite
direction before we can change direction from X's to O's
or vice versa, thus we can never have less than three
. t' 25boxes marked in any d1rec 10n.
Trading Patterns
Suppose we have paid $100 to enter a puzzle contest,
with S1,000 going to the person who could put the puzzle
together first. In assembling the puzzle we would be
alert for anything that would aid us. For example, are
the corners shaped in such a way that they warrant the
effort of seeing if the pieces match? Can the picture on
the face of the puzzle be of any assistance? Suppose we
had recently put a puzzle together that was identical or
highly similar to thi.s one. Think of the edge we would
have over our competitors. Having seen these patterns
before, we would know which pieces to discard and even how
to direct our energies in the most efficient manner.
25William L. Jiler, How Charts Can Help You in the
Stock Market (New York: Commodity Research Publishing Corp.,
1962) •
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Like the puzzle, the forces of supply and demand
on our chart form a pattern. If you cannot identify the
pattern (Chart 2A) it is because your eyes must be con-
di.tioned to recognize recurring patterns.
The market (or a particular security) goes
right on repeating the same old movements
in much the same old routine. The importance
of a knowledge of these phenomena (patterns)
to the trader and investor has been in no
whit diminished.26
The purpose of this section is to acquaint the
reader with the most important patterns. The formations
covered are predominant in the analysis of individual
securities as well as the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
Chart 2A represents the Dow Jones Industrial Average from
1958 to 1963. It is constructed in almost the same manner
as individual securities except that each square has a
higher value. Each square is worth five points in the Dow
Average and thus it takes fifteen points in the opposite
direction for a reversal. The major difference in plotting
the average is that it is not constructed on its interday
highs and lows, but rather on the Dow's 11:00, 12:00, 1:00,
26Robert D. Edwards, Technical Analysis of Stock Trends,
John Magee, Springfield, Mass., 1958.
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2: 00 and .3:,0 closing prices. Thus, neither the opening
price or the 3:00 prices are used. It wl11 frequently
appear that highs and lows are being plotted. For example,
in an up move the Dow Average hits its high of 520 at 1:00
and then falls (see first two vertical columns on Chart 2A)
to 510 at 1:30 the X's are shown at 520 and do not reflect
the slight retrenchment in the middle of the hour. But if
the market were to hit a low of 505 and remain at that level
until 2:00, then the chart would reflect the drop by three
O's as it did in the third column (August 1957).
The next few pages will discuss patterns taken primarily
from Chart 2A. These patterns will be plotted separately,
making note of breakouts and assigning probabilities for the
continued path of each.
The figures on the profit potential of various trading
formations where taken from CHARTCRAFT, Inc.; who in turn
received them from Professor Robert Earl Davis of Purdue
University. As of this date I have not been able to contact
Professor Davis.27
2?A. W. Cohen, PfiDt and Figgre Stock Market Trading
(New York: CHABTCRAFT, DC., 1970).
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The Double To£ ~d Double Bqttom Formatio~
The pattern of the Double Top a.nd Bot.tom ]'qrmatioI!:
is the most fundamental chart. From this formation all
trading patterns of stock market fluctuations are derived.
The Dow Theory, the forerunner of most modern theories,
is based on the premise of higher and higher tops or lower
and lower bottoms, with each breakthrough signaling a
28prominent trend in the market. From Chart 3;A we can see
how the buy sign is given. A higher top is a sign that demand
has finally overcome supply for a particular security or
group of securities. The trader buys into the market when
the Dow Jones Industrial Average breaks a new top, his
chances of success are 80.:;% that the market will go
higher. 29
There are several e~amples on Chart 3A of individual
securities. All are accurate. In a bull market the sell
sign is an indication th~t your security is weak and that
supply is overcoming demand. In a bear market the sell
28George w. BishOp, Charles H. Dow and the Dow Theor~
(New York: APpleton_century-Crofts, 1960).
29A• W. Cohen, point and Figure Stock Market Trading
(New York: CHARTCRAFl', Inc., 1970), p. 18.
,."",'
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sign is a money making indication, and the particular issue
should be sold short, or the transaction in the market as
a whole should be a short sell rather than a long. Short
sells (selling borrowed shares with the idea of purchasing
them back at a price lower than the value of the original
sale)are always more profitable in a bear market; their
probability of success is greater and the time to reach
objective is always shorter.
Fleaserefer back to Chart 2A. Do you see any
Double Top or Double Bottom Formations? As a whole, the
buy signs were correctly given at least 80.3% of the time.
As for the 19.7% referred to as false breakouts (when the
prognosis was incorrect), I will reduce this characteristic
margin of error with the introduction of market trend
lines later in the paper.
Before proceeding to another formation study the
pattern of LEASeO CORP. (Chart JA,Part B). LEASCO CORP.
gave a buy sign at 10 after breaking out of the conventional
Double Top Formation. The low in the third vertical
column is at 8, not 7 as with the previous low. This
formation, known to technical analysts as a Bullish Signal
Formation, has a slightlY higher probability of success:
80.4%. The time for the gain is 8.6 months, and the length
75
of the i i 26 4-h~ ,0ga n.8 .. //0.
The Bearish Signal Formation would have been formed
if LEASeO's second top (see Chart 3A, Part D) was formed at
25 rather than 26. These formations are mentioned because
they are very similar to the basic Double Top and Bottom
Formations. In analyzing the path of the Dow Sones Industrial
Average, keep in mind that there are manY varia.tions of the
basic patterns, and what we are looking for primarily is a
breakout from a previous high or low.
The Triple Top FormatiO~
The Triple Top Formation is the second of the two
classic chart patterns. Its probability of success is
greater because the consolidation in this pattern is far
more extensive. Money has been accumulating in this
security or group of securities for a longer duration,
and/or the market could be at a point where the forces of
supply and demand are almOst equal. For example, the
fundamental indicators partiallY composed of the leading
indicators, housing starts, durable good orders, factory
Shipments, could all be on the pluS side. On the negative
30Ibid., p. 20.-
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side could be the wa.lkout of the union members froIDthe
:pay board, threat of a new West Coast dock strike, higher
interest rates, and international currency problems. Under
these circumstances a Triple Top or Bottom }'ormation couLd
easily result. With a dramatic settlement of one or more
of these issues resulting in a major rise or fall in the
market.
On the buy side all that is needed is the pene-
tration of two previous tops, thus the formation must have
a minimum of five vertical columDS•
31
The first three
primary patterns on Chart 4A all have even lows, patterns
two and three have uneven tops. Examples of this pattern
start with GORDON JEWELERS. This security broke out of
the basic Triple ToP Formation at 14 (see Chart 4A, Part A)
sometime in December, after reaching 15~. A correction
(when nervous profit seekers take their profits) took place
and the security fell to 13~. From this point the stock
formed another Triple ToP pattern known to technical analysts
as a Bullish Signal Formation. \lhilethis formation is a
31Alexander If. llnee1an, studY llel_1!!' in Point and Fip;ure
Technique (New York: Rogers & Roberts, Ihc., 1957), p. 54·
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derivati ve of the basic Triple Top Formati.on, its probab:ility
of success is slightly lower, although it offers a higher
percentage gain. With two of these Triple Top Formations
back to back, there is no doubt in an analyst's mind that
this security is indeed going up. Generally speaking the
greater the degree of consolidation, the higher the
objective. For example, the formation of BLACK & DECKER
(Chart 4A, Part D) contains the most vertical columns and
a breakout from this wider pattern will yield a higher
price objective (to be explained later).
32
The most exciting formation (Chart 4A, Part 6) is
characterized by a long tail downward (upward in the
case of a short sell, see Chart 5A, Part 6). It is
exciting because the drop in price results from mis-
interpretation of information.~~ This response could
occur in either the second or the fourth columns. The
price of DISNEY (Chart 4A, Part E) fell suddenly when
investors became overly concerned about a report which
32Point and Figure, op.cit., pp. 56-58.
33Ibid., p. 32.
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mentioned declining consumer enthusiasm for their F'lorida
Disney World. After a fall of 8 points (from 98 to 90),
the price quickly rallied to 98, formin~ a Double Top.
Some investors took the rise as a last chance to bailout
before a major drop. The price after reaching 94 rose to
99 breaking a Triple Top.
A similar experience happened to me while at the
brokerage house. I invested in THIOKOL CHEMICAL at $10
per share. The security had broken a Triple Top Formati.on
and was currently selling at 13. without apparent cause
the price of the stock began to slip on heavy volume. It was
selling at 11 before I noticed the paragraph on the news
ticker.34 TRIOKOL had an explosion in one of its munition
plants. Being familiar with THIOKOL's operations I knew
this setback would not retard their earnings growth to any
noticeable degree. I did not wait for a new top to be broken.
I bought between 9~ and 10, with many orders below 9~
going unfilled. The market had obviously overacted to some
bad news; it wasn't long before the security was selling
for 18.
p. 2.
34"ExploSion," \JallStreet Journal, February 4, 1971,
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All that has been said for the Triple Top Formation
and Derivatives applies to the Triple Bottom Formation.
GREAT NORTHERN PAPER (see Chart 5A, Part A) i.s a good example
of the final outcome of security dissipation. The
interesting point about all of the examples is if someone
had shorted any of the four remaining securities in 1971;
they now, one year later and at the Dow 945 level, would,
in most cases, still be profiting. The square in pencil
is the securities present selling price.
Short sells are always more profitable to the trader,
providing that he resists the temptation of shorting in a
bull market and shorts only in a bear market. The time
required to make the expected profit is also shorter
than for a long as in the Double Bottom Formations.
Both of these points can be readily recognized by comparing
the probability statistics between long and short patterns
(compare Charts 414. and SA).
The price pattern of MEMOREX (Chart 5A, Part E)
contains many short sell patterns. How many can you recognize? •.
The Spread Triple Top and Bottom Formations are very
broad and contain at least six vertical columns. For this
reason a formation generally takes a year to develop. Within
that year the fluctuation of the security price makes man..'Y
J; _ ..
IS
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of'the patterns we have already covered. For example,
SYNTEX (Chart 6A, Part A) gave a buy sign twice with
penetrations from two Double Top Formations sometime in
November 1971• In the case of SAFEGUARD IND. (Chart 6A,
Part B) a sell sign was given by the breakout from a
Double Bottom Formation sometime in May 1971. A strong
warning against buying should have been noticed when a
higher top was not reached in June.
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The Bea.rish and Bullish Reversed Formations
The most dangerous of all the patterns is the very
deceiving Bearish and Bullish Signal Reversed Formations
(Chart 7A). The Bearish Signal Reversed Formation starts
with the common bearish formation, The Double Bottom.
The first five columns (Chart 7A, Part A) give us the
classic pattern of lower tops and lower bottoms. However,
the seventh column does not follow the script. Without any
base of accumulation, demand for the stock suddenly picks up.
The price of the security (or group of securities) rises
rapidly, a double top is broken and a buy sign is given.
The price movement is very quick, volume is high, a trader
in a short position at this point has one day to cover
himself or face staggering losses.
The reason for the sharp reversal can be attributed
to many things. In the case of a particular security,
the company may have just announced the discovery of an oil
well or some other dramatic item. As for the Dow Jones
Industrial Average, the market as a whole could have
responded to end of the war news, a major political speech,
or some oth.er heartening news.
A contrary course of events forms the Bullish
, --I
I
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Reversed Signal Formation (Chart 7A. Part B). A company's
stock might rise in anticipation of a huge contract, but
in the end another company might get the contract. The
same course of events on a broader scale effects the Dow
Jones Industrial Average. Favorable newS of the economy
may have been flowing regularlY when some major depressing
news reached the public'S eye. A Budden earthquake or
some other phenomenon occurs. The result is a sudden drop
in the market and an investor whO is long should not waste
time in getting out.
The Bearish Signal Reversed Formation usually occurs
at market bottoms, after manY months of depressing news.
The pattern is alsO an eXcellent indicator for predicting
the bottom of a particular security. An excellent time
to buy occurs if the market or security has a high short
interest; traders whO are short will rapidly seek to cover
t 35heir short positions, fueling the rise.
35lnvestment Analysi~. op.cit •• p. 509.
----.~----- ---~-------
87
Trend Lines
In the previous pages I have introduced the most
inportant and common trading formations. Each pattern
has its own probability of success, although there are
many times when a security develops as one of the previously
studied patterns but does not perform or follow the
prescribed course. When the market or a security breaks a
higher top and does not continue its climb, it is referred
to as a false breakout. The probability of a false
breakout is equal to the difference between 100% and tbe
probability of a successful breakout. For example,
100%-80.3~19.7% which is the probability of a false
breakout resulting from a Double Top Formation.
The purpose of the next section is to reduce the
proba.bility ofa false breakout by introducing another
tt!chnical book, the Trend Line. Trends are lines connecting
points, as in a line or bar chart. The Trend Lines in
the Point and Figure method are very easy to construct, and
much easier to work with than line or bar charts. Point
and Figure Trend Lines also give the User a more refined
image because the lines rarely have to be changed.
Of all the principles used by the chartist there is
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none as important as the Trend I.ine. To the reader or
novice however, it is the most difficult to believe. The
question of its merits arises from its simplicity. One
always expects to have some highly technical expla.nfition
for the most beneficial of applications.
The two Trend Lines discussed in this section are
the Bullish Support Line, and the Bearish Resistance Line.
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The Bullish Support Line
The most important of the trend lines is the Bullish
Support Line. It is constructed only after a security (or
the market) has given a buy sign after a previous Bullish
Support Line (BSL) has been broken. Chart 8A gives t\-JO
examples: LEASeO broke its BSL at 40 in April '1969. Since
then it exhibited a constant downward trend, giving one
sell signal after another. LEASCO finally bottomed out
at 7~ in July 1970. It gave its first buy sign at 10
(August 1970), allowing us to construct a new BSL.
To construct the Trend Line all one need do is
draw a line from the lowest 0 through each higher corner
76of a square as you move to the right.) This line dissolves
when it is broken. At a later date when another buy sign
is given, another Bullish Support Line is constructed.
One does not have to be very skilled to see how accurate
and helpful the Trend Line can be. If you bought every tlme
the price of LEASCO hit the BSL, profits would have been
substantial.
36A• W. Cohen, Point and Figure Stock Market Tradi!?£
(New York: Chartcraft, Inc., 1970), pp. 40, 45.
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Some t '
echnician
s
draw a new BSL on just a minor breaktlu'ough;
the line in this case WOl.lld be drawn from C,,11,". Ex' .
-;1':' per.~ence
teaches one to wait l..Ultil the trend line i.s solidly broken,
that is, until the Jnarket pr-ice falls at least rwo :to three
squares below the BSL. June 1971 gave another serious test
of LEASCO's BSL. The demand for the security quickly
increased, however, causing the price of the stock to rise
In November '1970, IJEASCO's BS1 was almost;" 'k
_ . [)ro 'en.
and then bounce off the BSL at 19 later in the month. The
primary BSL was finally broken in October at $20 per share.
As a result a new BSL was constructed after the first buy
Sign, which was given by the Double Top Formation. The
price of LEASCO is once again resting on the BSL. It will
be interesting to see if this situation results in another
excellent buying opportunity.
The other security on Chart 8A is ORl'lONTDRUG "
CHF.I'lICAL,a very volatile stock whose compru>;Yis trying to
perfect a cancer skin test. ORl'lONTreached a high of 30
in 1967 after buying the rights to the skin test. Since
then it has exhibited a downward trend. ORMONT gave its
first buy sign in JulY 1970 at ), and I bought the security
at 10 in February 1971• Since only the closing bid prices
are plotted for aTC securities, interdBY highs and lows cannot
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be observed. ORMONT did reach a hi.gh of 21 during March
1971 although it did not close at that price. At a news
conference later that month ORMONT stated that more research
was needed on their cancer test before it could be mar-ket ed ,
The security quickly went into a tailspin and within two
days the price had fallen at least 12 points. But where
would it bottom out? A quick look at the chart shows Trend
Line support at 8~9. Potential buyers were to find the
BSL credible, the stock hit an interday low of 9, where
demand quickly supported a price of 14. Supply once again
rallied its forces, sending the price down to 9~. Although
the BSL held again, the rebound was not as great. The next
attack broke the Trend Line with a Double Bottom Formation.
The security rose to 11~ forming a double top (very bad
sign) before solidly plunging through the BSL in July 1971.
ORMONT reached a low of ~ before giving a new buy sign
at 13~ (derivative of the triple top forlIlatlon).
Experience can teach several things about this very
powerful Trend Line, sometimes very painfully. The Bullish
Support Line can be looked upon as the gates to the Trojan
Empire. The gates are very strong, well capable of repulsing
many attacks; but once the gates are breached, the city is
lost. In thi sease, the underlying support of the m.arket has
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colla.psed and the trend is now downward (bearish).
Following are several rules that 1 have put together
based upon my years of experience. As for probabilities,
significant research carried to the degree that would
assign numerical values to the potential support of the
Trend Line could not be located. However, the following
eight rules are proven in regard to the Bullish Support
Line.
Rule 1. The probability of the BSL remaining
intact depends on the company's funda-
mental position: its income statement,
balance sheet, etc.
Rule 2. Once all means of investigation have been
exhausted and the company is pronounced
healthy, prepare to buy the stock. The
closer you buy to the Bullish Support Line,
the better your expected gain. If you are
within three squares of the BSL, take
advantage of the opportunity. The probabili.ty
of a price rebound off the BSL under these
circumstances is 95%.
Rule 3. There are times when the market goes into a
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50-100 point tailspin: if the BSL of a parti-
cular security (Dow above its BSL) falls
only 2-3 squares below i.tsBSL ignore the
break, under these circumstances.
Rule 4. If the price of the market or a security falls
more than three squares below its BSL,
abandon your long position. The probability
of a new market up-trend following the break
is only 10%. I could find no market recovery
from such a position dating as far back as
1956.
Rule 5. If your security has broken its BSL while
the Dow's Average is well above its BSL,
take this as a strong sell signal.
Rule 6. Assume only a short position in the market
if the BSL is broken. The probabilities
of the various short patterns are credible
when used below the BSL.
Rule 7. Ignore all short sell patterns that are
slightly above the BSL.
Rule 8. Although the probabilities assigned to the
patterns assume the patterns are employed
in conjunction with the market trend; the
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pattern probabilities do have a high degree
of merit when used against the trend of the
market (see Chart 5A). Short sell signs
given by the market above its BSL sr.oul.dbe
taken as a sign that the market is weak,
and a major correction is about to take place.
No new commitments should be made l.nthe
market until the short sell has run its course
or the Dow Average is within 5 squares of
the BSL. The investor at the beginning of
the tailspin is very sure the BSL will hold.
But as the market falls, a high degree of
pessimism takes over. By the time the Dow
Average is close enough to penetrate the
BSL, the investor blows his cool or loses
his stomach. In such a case a stop loss order
is recommended. One must remember that the beau-
tiful women (or whatever you desire) go to
the men who are bold and daring.
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The Bearish Resistance 1,ine
'I'he old cliche that whatever goes up must come down
frequently holds true of the securities markets. 'when
the market is above the Bullish Support Line it is cla.ssi-
fied as bullish because it is above its trend line. The
converse, a negative Trend Line, is called the Bearish
Resistance Line.
The Bearish Resistance Line is constructed by drawing
a line down from the high of the market (or security).
The Trend Line is only constructed once a sell sign is
given.37 rr'hisresistance line limits the upside potential.
of the market swing. Chart 9A gives some good examples.
In the case of LITTON IND., the security peaked out at 34
after breaking a Double Top. The Bearish Resistance Line
was not constructed until a sell sign was given at 29 sometime
in June 1971. The Bearish Resistance Line (BRL) may be
broken many times, as in the case of KEARNEY & TRECKER.
The first BRL was constructed from a high of 40 reached in
September 1967 after a sell sign was given at 32 in November.
This BRL however, was penetrated in January 1968 when
KEARNEY reached a new high of 41. A new sell sign ws.s given
37Ibid., pp. 48-54.
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at 36 in October 1968, thus a new BRL was constructed from
the high of 41. The BRL is similar to the Bullish Support;
Line in that the more it is tested the more credible it
becomes. Generally it should be tested at least once
before assigning a hf.gn degree of credibility to it.
The fact that the market has a BRL does not indicate
that one should abandon his long position. As long as the
BRL remains intact, the fluctuations of the market will be
confined in the area between the BSI, and the BRL. The sell
signs above the BSL should be taken as a message that a
correction will take place, but as long as the correction
confines itself above the BSL, the trend of the market
is still upward.
One can readily see that as the trend lines converge
on one another, the trading area will get smaller. The
forces of supply and demand hurl one attack after another
at each other until a breakthrot~h is achieved. Sometimes
the breakthrough can be very dramatic as in the case of
WRIGLEY (See Chartcraft technical summary of the occurrence,
Chart 9B).
In the case of LITTON (Chart 9A), supply overcame
demand in December 1971 with a Double 'Bottom Formation. At
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this point there was no supporting upward trend line.
Although the price of the security did rally, almost
breaking through the BRL with a powerful TTiple Top
Pattern, it was repulsed. Upon reaching 22, the investor
should have realized LITTON was a major short sell
candidate.
The price of KEARNEY & TRECKER (after bouncing
off the BRL twice), almost broke through with a Spread
Triple Top Formation in .January 1969 (Chart 9A). 'I'hi s
illustrates a ma,jor maxim: Never buy close to the BRL.
Wait until the line is broken. The rebound off the BSL
started three squares above the trend line. After an
abrupt rise, it once again went into a tailspin that
was to carry it through the BBL. KEARm."'Yis in the
machine tool industry, thus its price fluctuates with
monthly reports of machine tool orders. It doesn't
require much imaginati.on to see machine tool orders
tapering off in the later part of 1968. Some months
would be good and some bad, and in time the slowly de t.er-t.o-
rating orders would change the trend of this volatile
security. An interesting pOint is t.hat;three yeaTS after
the BRL was drawn it was still credible. KEARNEY bounced
off the BRL in September 1971, and again in March 1972.
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In my opinion KEARNEY has built a solid foundation
upon which a sustained up-swing could take place. Supported
by rising machine tool orders, this security offers the
potential of rapid capital gains. When it will break its
BRIJ is anyone's guess, but its rapidly diminishing trading
area (above the BSL and below the BRL) would indicate soon.
(The following are several rules I have put together:)
RUle 1. Never buy within ten squares of the BRL. '1lbe
probability of.a ricochet off the line after
it has been tested is 90%. rrhis probabili ty
decreases as the market begins to get Strpport
from the BSIJ. However, the probab1lity of
the BSL holding under such circumstances is
also diminished. This is the time for a
major review of one's fundamental indicators.
Rule 2. The higher the Dow Jones Industrial Average is
above the BSL, the more powerful the BRL becomes
and the more susceptible the market is for a
correction. Under these conditions it is
possible to assume a short position in the
market, but the probability of a successful
trade is less tha.n those previously stated.
for a short pattern. The most opportune time
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for a short occurs when the Dow (or a
security) is closest to the BHL. This can
readily be seen from the examples in Chart
9A. The following shorts would have been
very profitable: LITTON @ 33,32,30,25, and
KEARNEY @ «o ,3 5 , 30, and 16~. KEARNEY at
14~ is too close to the BSL for a short.
In cases where the secur-ity Ls very volatile,
a stop loss is recommended.
Rule 3. Buy signs given far below the BRL can. be
taken, but the investor should abort his
long position upon approaching the BRL or
when a new sell sign is given.
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Overall_l'rice Obijecti.ves
At the begi.nning of every trade an investor should
a.lways have an idea of what percentage gain to expect.
rrhe patterns presented all have a percentage gain figu.re.
However, money and time can be lost trading from one
pattern to another. In the course of a major uptrend it's
very possible for the market (or security) to go through
sev'eral patterns, each giving successive buy or sell signs.
The Point and Figure method of charting offers the user two
methods by which he can calculate an overall price
b· t' 38o Jec ~ve.
The first is called the Horizontal Count. To
calculate the price objective by this method count the
number of vertical columns in a pattern and multiply the
sUlB by the va.lue of the three squa.res.39
For example, to calculate the price objective of
LITTON' 6 Spread '1_1riple Top Buy Formation (Chart 9A) buy
sign given at 18~, August 1970): counting the vertical
columns we get 8, 8 times (x) 1~ (each square is worth 50¢)
38 .Ibld., pp. 55-57.
39Ibid., pp. 57-61.
-- - ---------_---
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is 12. Adding 12 to the lowest point in the pattern, 15y",
we get 12 + 15~ ;0;: 27~. As we can see, LIT'rON reached 27
two months later.
'rhe same can be done for KEARNEY & 'I'RECKER(Chart 9A) ..
In the first pattern there are 7 vertical columns, 7 ttmes
(x) 75¢ (each square is worth 25¢) is 5. 5 added to the low
of 2 is 7. Seven was reached in May 1965. In the examples
presented here the price objectives were achieved right on
the nose. I have found this method to be very reliable.
Generally one can expect the price of the market to come
within four squares of the price objective. This method is
very easy to compute and can be used Ln computing e1ther a
new price objective or in confirming a past price objective
in an upward trend.
The Horizontal Method can also be used for shorts.
In March 1969, KEARNEY broke out of a quadruple bottom.
There are 7 vertlcal columns, 7 x .,(each square is worth
$1) = 21, 21 .from 30 (the high) = 9. As we can see, KEARNEY
reached 9 in April 1970. Although we could have taken a
short position at 24 we would have had to cover upon
approaching the BBL. As mentioned earlier, a price objective
below the BSL becomes credi.ble when the line is broken.
lOS
The second method is called the Vertical Method.
Its use is slightly more compli.cated than the horizontal
method. To compute the price objective in this method,
one counts the number of squares in the first upward
thrust. The vertical count should be taken after the first
buy sign is given following a major decline, or when a
new BSL is constructed. A vertical count of the LITTON
up move yields a price objective of 45. 'l'hereis a
total of 20 squares in the first up move. The squares
below 20 are worth 50¢ each, therefore, 12 x ~~ ~ 18.
There a.re eight squares above 20 each worth $1; therefore,
8 x 3 =24. We then add the two to get the total advance,
24 + 18 - 42. We add 42 to the lowest point in the pattern
and get a price objective of 5~ (42 + 15~ ~ 5~~).
The vertical count is used to get a long term price
objective. Sometimes it takes three to five years for the
objective to be reached. A vertical count objec ti.ve should
always be discarded when the BSL is broken and a new one
taken when a new BSL is drawn. In the case of LITTON IND.,
it reached its horizontal count but failed to rea.ch its
vertical count objective.
This example brings out the merits of b0th price
objective methods. The horizontal count gives more of an
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immediate term objective (6 months to one year): it is
more reliable because there is less time for the market
to be subjected to outside influences. The vertical
count, as long range projection, Ls subjected to many
influences such as wars, and natural disasters. Although
the vertical count has been found to be fairly accurate,
always re-check its prognosis by taking the latest hori-
zontal pattern readings.
A vertical count of LIT'TON's December 1971 Double
Bottom plunge threw the BSL yields an objective of seven:
4 x 1~ = 6, 4 x 3 = 12, 6 + 12 = 18, 18 - 25 (the high of
the pattern) equals seven.. As long a.sthe market remains
bullish, be very skeptical of this projection. In a
bearish market the seven could easily become a reality.
Generally, the vertical count is more accurate when applied.
to the Dow Jones Industrial Average than to indi.v·idual
securities.
The following are several rules based on observations
of overall price objectives:
Rule 1. Probabilit;y of the Horizontal Count bei.ng
reached is 90%.
Rule 2. Probability of the Vertical Count being
reached is 7Cfj,.
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Rule 3. The price objectives computed in the
later stages of a bull market are
seldom reached. Close a long account
out as the Dow Average crosses the BSL.
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Summary
By using graphically recorded price movements,
transa.ctions of investors both large and small have been
traced. It is through carefully and accurately recording
price changes that patterns develop. A study of these
investment patterns has shown them to occur time and time
again. Professor Earl Davis of Purdue University has done
much for technical analysis by developing statistics for
the various trading formations. Although the probabilities
of a successful trade as predicted by the various patterns
is much higher than that for the r2 as determined by its
respective independent variable, there is still the
probability of a false signal.
Although there has been no statistical research done
concerning the use of Trend Lines and Price Objective
Methods, their help in further diminishing the investors
chances of taking a false signal cannot be understated.
The stock market as defined by trend analysis is bullish
when above the Bullish Support Line, but there is always
the question of how much weight to assign a sell signal
above this powerful Trend Line.
In an effort to decrease the probability of an
investor basing his actions on a false signal, the use of
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volume is introduced in the following chapter. In its
totality the actions of traders will be recorded by changes
in both price and volume.
CHAPl'ER 5
NEBBIA PRICE VOLUME ANALYSIS
The previous section indicates that althougb major
price objectives are generally reached and the use of
technical analysis is very helpful. the investor still
finds himself plagued by false buy and sell signals.
The techn.ical analysis employed traces the consolidation
into the market by price patterns. A sell or buy sign
is given when investors assert themselves through price
movements causing a breakout on either the upside or
downside of the consolidation.
There is another way investors can leave their marks
and that is by volume. There have been several studies
on volume with individual securities. But to date there
has been no study on the relationship between the market
(Dow) and volume. The intention in this section is to
present the Nebbia Price Volume Index--by presenting its
composi tLon , blending it to the resea.rch that has already
been carried out with volume in respect to individual
securities, and then testing it to see if volume can help
us eliminate the false buy and sell signals present in the
110
111
basic form of technical analysis.
To construct the Nebbia Price VOlume Index, all
that is needed is the closing Dow price on every Friday.
It could have been every Wednesday or Tuesday; the
important matter is that a reading is taken once a week.
Once every week is necessary because of the great
activity in the market.
Also, an indicator must be responsive to changing
forces within the market. In other words, we want to be
as close as possible to the lead wolf, the major investment
advisors. At the same time, the readings were not taken
twice a week because points would have been so scattered
that would not be identified. Friday is chosen because
all data was available on a weekly basis with Friday as
the close of the week. Another reason for the choice is
that most workers are conscious of Sunday as the day of
rest with Monday the beginning of another hard weeki and
this psychological fact is firmly established.
To construct the Nebbia Price Volume Chart: (Appendix E)
1) Obtain the closing price on Friday of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (if the market was not op-med Friday
the next preceding day).
2) Obtain the total volume for the week.
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3) Obtain the percentage change in the Dow price for the
week.
4) Multiply the percentage change times the volume for
the week.
5) Add or subtract the data on the cumulative index
depending on its sign. (I started with a cumulative index
number of 5,000. One can start with any number, all that
is important is the trend).
6) After creating the series, plot it on the graph with
the cumulative price-volume index on the vertical axis.
Each square on the vertical axis is worth 20 points in the
Nebbia Price Volume Index. Movements within a square are
of minor consequence, since we are interpreting a trend
not an absolute value.
7) Plot the date on the horizontal axis.
What the chart shows is a trend of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average that reflects changes in price as well as volume.
The points on the chart however, are meaningless unless
buy and sell signs are given.
Buy Signals
Chart 10 illustrates the four buy signs used in the
Nebbia Price Volume Index. The buy sign is given whenever
the cumulative average rises above its latest low point.
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It must remain above the low point for at least two weeks.
If the second upturn should fall back a little (as in
Buy Signal #3) the buy sign is considered given after the
market reasserts itself. The patterns used to form the
buy signs are based on research that has proven the
ability of volume to pick out a trend in security prices.40
There are several basic princlP~'. which are included in
the author's buy signs.
Rule 1. "Increasing volume during an advance, with
intervening pauses in the advance or
reactions occurring on light volume indi-
cate that there is underlying demand
which is greater than the supply. This
pattern ie almost a sure sign of an
41advance. It
This principle is taken into account in the
buy signs shown in squares two and three.
In both cases the rise slowed either because
of loW volume or a small price change. The
40Kermit Charles Zieg, Jr., Ticker Tape Trading (New York:
Business Reports, Inc., 1970), p. 50.
41Ibid., p. 42.
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buy sign comes after the trend has reasserted
itself as in squares two and three.
Rule 2. When volume rises substantially, it is a sign
that investors have established a trend.
"If the price rises at the same time (as
volume) you have a buy signal. ,,42
This principle is represented in buy signs
as shown in squares one and four. In both
cases volume and price rose together (or
one strong enough to make up for the other).
There was no intermittent pause or reaction
in this buy signal.
Sell Signals
The sell signal (Chart 11 ) is the opposite of the buy
signal.
Rule 3. When there is increased voluJIleat the top of
a rally or an advance, lasting at least two
weeks with no appreciable gain in price, a
turning point has been made.43 This principle
is shown in sell squares three and four.
42Z' J 61~eg, r., p. •
43Ibid., p. 47.
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Rule 4. The fourth principle states that a stock
(in this case the entire market) showing
a slow upward move~ent on light volume
but stops at some top beloW a previous
top showS a lack of demand ,"and whereas
selling orders likewise are light, this
action frequentlY marks a rounding-over
turn, which $a1 be followed by increasing
44-
volume on the down side."
This principle is exemplified in sell
With both methods combined the following are required
squares one and two.
for investor response.
Buy Sign
Buy into the market when a buy sign is given by both
indicators. That is, the bUY sign must be given by both the
basic form of technical analysiS presented in Chapter 4, and
the buy sign given by the Bebbie Price Volume Index. Both
must be given within twO weeks of one another. This double
prerequisite before enter1D1 into tbe market assures the
investor that be is responding to decisive market forces.
44-Ibid., p. 73·
---_- ----
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A price rise with little volume increase will not draw
the investor into the market. On the other hand, a small
price rise on heavy volume will not draw the investor in
either. The final result ia that the trader is prompted
to react when both price and volume assert themselves
decisively in an upward direction. The requirement that
both signs concur within a two week period assures the
trader that the first sign has not changed before the
second is received.
Sell Sip
8ell when either one of the signals show a sell
sign providing we have a'profit at the time. If we do not
have a profit do not take a loss until ~ methods show
a sell sign. The premise of this rule is based on the
old cliche, "8 bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.tt
The closing of our trade b, a eell sign from either method
gives a sensitive barometer to measure total trader dis-
satisfaction with the current trend of the market. If the
investor is taking a loss at the time ,the first sell signal
is receiyed, he .hould not take a sell. The market's swing
within a pattern should afford him a more opportune time
to liquidate hi. holdings. If howeyer. both methods give
a 8ell sign, then the market has decisively changed trend.
119
It is best under these conditions to take loases immediately
and ill_est with tbe trend of the market.
Sell Short
Sell short only when ~ methods show a sell sign
within a two week period. Statistics presented ill Ohapter 4
show that quicker profits ean be ..de through short selling.
Thus, an investor not taking a position in a bear urket would
be passing a most oPJOrtuDe time to invest.
Cover Short, (Ol
Cover our short if either on. of the indicators show
a buy Sign, providing we have a profit. Only take a loss
on a trade if Site iudicators show a buy sign. Major bear
markets terminate nth a selling climax. Under these
conditions an investor must bave an extremely responsive
indicator; or .18e. the aark~t rally will quickly absorb
hi. profits. In tb18 cas., it will most lic.q be the
.ebbl. Price Volua. Index which proteets his profits
because volume i8 ...ery he.", during major market tuming
points.45
With the bu, aDd sell rules stated we are now ready
45Zieg, Jr., p. 12.
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to take the test. Provided is a point-and-figure chart
(Chart 12) from 1968 through 1972. Also the Nebbia Price
Volume Index (Chart 13) already~lotted with signals marked I
accordingly. Those in,& red boa indicate a sell (8) or sell
I •.~
short trade (SH) as both indicator. showed a sell sign. The
blue box indicates either a cover from a short position (C)
or a buy (L) indicating both signs gave a buy sign. The
blue asterisks (.) indicate when the pOint and figure
method took Us out of the market, example August 1969.
A. a matter of interest Sprinkel's six month moving
money supply indicator is plotted on the top of each page
(Chart 13). GHIII indicates a declining rate of monetary
growth; while BLUE indicates an increasing rate of money
growth.
A summary of the trades is provided after the data
on the Nebbia Price Volume Index.
Chart 12
DOW...JONES INDUSTRIAL-AVERAGE(l968-1972)
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NEBB:IA PRI CE-VOLUME INDEX(1968-1972)
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TABLE 2
BASIC TECHNICAL ANALYSIS COMBINED
WITH THE NEBBIA PRICE-VOLUME INDEX
SUMMARY OF TRADES
TRADE BASIC TECH.
DIRECTION METHOD
SHORT (Sh)
COVER (C)
LONG (L)
SELL (S)
875
Jan. 1968
850
April '68
850
Apr. 1968
SHORT (Sh) 895
July, '68
COVER (C)
LONG (L)
SELL (S)
LONG (L)
SELL (S)
930
Sept. '68
970
Nov. '68
COVER (C)
SHORT (Sh) 940
Jan. '69
130
NET
DOW LEVEL AT GAIN GAIN
NEBBIA PRICE- WHICH WE ENTER OR OR
VOLUME INDEX OR LEAVE MARKET LOSS LOSS
898
Jan. 12, 168
865
Apr. S, '68
898
May 17, '68
888
July 26, '68
892
Aug. 23, '68
892
Aug. 23, '68
948
Nov. 1, '68
965
Nov. 15, '68
966
Dec. 20, '68
966
Dec. 20, '68
938
Jan. 24, '69
875
850 25 2S
865
898 33 58
888
892 -4 54
930
948 18 72
970
966 -4 68
940
938 2 70
TABLE 2 (continued) 131
I
I NET
DOW LEVEL AT GAIN GAINTRADE BASIC TECH. NEBBIA PRICE- WHICH WE ENTER OR ORDIRECTION METHOD VOLUME INDEX OR LEAVE MARKET LOSS LOSS-.
LONG (L) 925 935Mar. '69 Mar. 28, '69 935SELL (S) 937 937 2 72
May 29, '69
SHORT (Sh)
COVER (C)
SHORT (Sh)
COVER (C)
SHORT (Sh)
COVER (C)
SHORT (Sh)
COVER (C)
SHORT (Sh)
COVER (C)
910
June '69
830
A '69ug •.
805
Oct. '69
840
Nov. '69
765
Jan. '69
760
Apr. '70
705
June '70
924
June 6, '69 910
830 80 152
808
Oct. 3, '69862
Oct. 24, '69
808
862 -54 98
823
Nov. 21, '69797
Dec. 26, '69
823
797 26 124
798
Jan. 9, '70
757
Feb. 20, '70
765
757 8 132
775
Apr. 17, '70 760
705 18755
TABLE 2 (continued) 132
NET
DOW LEVEL AT GAIN GAIN
TRADE BASIC TECH. NEBBIA PRICE-
WHICH WE ENTER OR OR
DIRECTION METHOD VOLUME INDEX
OR LEAVE MARKET LOSS LOSS-
LONG (L) 715 735July ,70 July 17, '70
735
SELL (S) 758
758 23 210
Sept. 18,170
LONG (L)
SELL (S)
SHORT (Sh)
COVER (C)
SHORT (Sh)
COVER (C)
LONG (L)
COVER (C)
775Oct. '70
768Oct. 9, '70
936May 7, '71
168 378768936
900
June
900
Aug.
889June 18, '71 -11 367889900'71
'71
880
Oct.
830
Nov.
874Oct. 15, '71 44 411874830'71
'71
870
Dec.
873
Dec. 17, '71
954Apr. 28, '72
81 492873954'71
17 TOTAL TRADESTOTAL NET GAIN FROM TRADES 492 DOW POINTS
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Summary
Beyond a doubt the Nebbia Price Volume Index Theory
has proven ttse1f as the test. Combined with the standard
form of technical analysis provided in Chapter 4, a net
gain of 492 pOints on the Dow was made within four years.
Surely this is a tremendous increase over Sprinkel's theory
which provided only a 265 paint gain over nine years.
The importance of this 'result shows that traders
make their future intentions known by volume as well as
!
(
I
(
price. Support levels, resistance levels and most important
patterns show minor and major trading boundaries established
by both price and volume. These boundaries when broken
deserve more impetus because traders' performances are recorded
in the only two ways they have of influencing the market.
It is through volume that large powerful investors (big
wolves) leave their tracks most clearly. No longer is tbere
a need to second guess the course depicted by the omnipotent
mutual and pension funds, as we are on their heels.
AlthOugh there were a few unsuccessful trades, a net
gain of 492 Dow points over a four year period is more than
enough to overshadow the small 108ses. In two of the four
unsuccessful trades, a loss need not have resulted if the
Lnveat.or-had adhered to trend line rules. For example, Rule
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7 in Chapter 4 concerning the Bullish Support Li.newould
have prohibited Short Sell trade executed at the Dow 888
level on July 26, 1968. The Average was within 20 points
of the Bullish Support Line; thus, the trade never should
have been made. In August of 1971, a short sale trade
was closed out for a loss at the Dow Jones 900 level. At
that time the Dow Average was within 15 points of the
Bearish Resistance Line. Rules 1 and 2 concerning the BRL
presented in Chapter 4 would have told the investor that
the Dow would meet upward resistance very shortly. Thus,
there was no need to take the loss until the BRL was broken.
Because it takes two weeks to reverse a trend, a
problem is created with the Nebbia Price Volume Index.
Investors might be caught in an extremely rapidly rising
or falling market opposite in direction to their trade.
In most cases, resorting to the basic form of technical
analysis based on price will get the investor out of the
market before he takes a loss. But, if the size of the
pattern is large and the pace of the market is very active
(as exemplified by the trade of October 1969), then it would
be possible for an investor to be caught in the wrong
direction with his trade.
Another problem with the Nebbia Price Volume method
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is that it requires a constant maintenance of charts
(which is a rather laborious task), but the return on bis
time is well worth the effort.
Because of the sensitivity of the Nebbia Price
Volume Index to investors' actions, it is possible to get
cut short (taken but of the market) on a favorable long
term market trend. But it is the sensitivity of the index
that gets the investor out of the market before he loses
much of his profits.
The final fault of this method stems from the above
paragraph. The number of trades is increased and at times
it might appear that we are out to make our broker rich.
But, if we invest in a volatile security, as exemplified in
the previous section of this paper, we should be able to
outperform the Dow in moving up and down ..
In spite of the number of trades, the quantity of
false signals has been greatlY diminished. By covering
Chart wito the acetate cover, one can readily see that
manY point-and-figure buy and sell signs were not taken.
In those cases, volume indicated that investors failed to
assert themselves in sufficient quantity to establish a
trend in the market.
Technical Analysis is a major prerequisite for
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investment strategy. Almost all security houses provide
a daily technical report to their brokers.
Every morning we receive a technical telegram from
Dick West, our technical analyst in New York. In
most cases, I have found him to be very accurate.
The use of voaume as presented by Ralph Nebbia
creates another market measuring tool. Ralph
and I have worked very closely in testing and
applying his volume theory to investment strate~6
The results, to date, have been most gratafying.
Another ACcountant for Thomson & McKinnon states:
I h~ve always k.ept point-and-figure charts and have
rel1ed on them extensively for predicting market
~urning points. A rise in price with little volume
1.S generally short lived. A rise in price accompanied
by heavy volume is a strong indication that the
trend will continue. Mr. Nebbia has introduced a
way ~f measuring and recording volume changes which
~omb1ne very orderly with my point-and-figure charts.
am currently applying his volume theory to my
trad~ tactics. The result, at this pOint has beenvery favorable.47 '
In the end, price movements are created by all investors
expressing their preferences whereby influencing the market
a.bove all else.. By understanding and recording their act:i.ons,
as a whole, one can develop solid investment policies.
Finally, it is the traders who weight the endless
46John Cooke, Account Executive, Thomson & McKinnon,
Indianapolis, Indiana, 46220. Personal interview, July 27, 1972.
47Jim Gilbert, Account Executive, Thomson & McKinnon,
Indianapolis t Indiana, 46220. Personal inte·rview, July 27, 1972.
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sea of f acto r-sand decide price movements; thus, it Ls
folly to beli.eve that they leave behind no indication
upon which to base future investment policies.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
To mrulY stock market enthusiasts, the thought of
predicting security movements by charts and graphs is a
bit bizzare. Even those ski~led in the tools and jargon
of the business world find themselves hard-pressed to
believe that the trend of the market is not merely the
result of sporadic, unpredictable news. They may view
the stock market as a huge melting pot into which all
economic news is poured, with the quality of the news
determining the taste of the broth~
Economic or ]'undamental Analysis and research is
helpful to the security trader. Carefully ga.thered
economic information assures the trader that the environ-
ment is conducive to the direction of his trade. If the
trader is long, he is sure the economy is growi.ng stronger
and his security is i.na vigorous industry, holding con-
siderable economic prowess. Many times when I was sure
a perspective security was fundamentally sound, I did not
wait for a buy sign from my technical patterns, but, bought
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the security on a technieal support area (when it hits
the BSL) e
I h.ave always thought it was the heart beat of the
economy that would ultimately decide the trend of the market.
Problems arise .from the acute broad. swings of the market
which Occur from time to time for little or no reason at
all.. Ma..nytimes the fluctuation in a securities price
is totally unrelated. to its expected earnings. For example,
why does a company reporting record earnings and selling for
$20.00 a share suddenly drop to $16.00 a share, even though
its economic base has i.ncreased? There is simply no end to
the list of companies whose stock does not reflect accurately
their present or future earnings capacity_ If the
example is broadened to include the thirty companies
comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the dis-
parity between the market's present selling price and its
inherent market value is further widened.
A trader relying on Fundamental Analysis has
several major weaknesses. Often he is drawn into the market
during culminating periods of pessimism and optimism. The
stock market is a leading indicator; thus, when the economy
is reachi.ng its peak, at the height of optimism, the market
is already coming down. The trader with his investment worth
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tesa is r-e..uc t an t to sell; as a result, he is locked into
h:s stock for the coming bear market.
Ano t.hez-basic problem of fundamental analysis is
that it requires a long chain of events that must be
carried out (Sprinkel's theory). If a firm is expected
to report higher earnings, then it must go through the
process of making those earnings, the investor must be
awar-e of the superior performance and so on down the line
of events.
The final problem of fundamental theories is the
susceptibility of their models to forces and powers
influencing the market from outside their models. Their
models are not flexible and cannot compensate for these
Qutstde pressures.
Hopefully, the merits of technical analysis are
apparent at this point. To the technical analyst all news,
economic or otherwise, is reflected by security price
movements. Included are actions taken by knowledgea.ble
and powerful investors who by their size and recognition
can influence the trend of the market and individual
securities. The NEBBIA Frice Volume Index adds to the
ability of teChnical analysis in recording their actions.
no." volume performance can be traced with pr-Lce movements
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I)rovid.::".ng 8. more precise recording instrument. It is as
if it were known not only what farm would be raided by
the wolves, but by how many wolves.
There is no long chain of events th"t must be con-
summated before the market can rise. Technical t.oo ls show
the building of support for the market by investors, when
th.e securities are finally desired by a large size of the
investment com.munity a buy pattern is given; the individual
investor (small wolf) recognizes this pattern and enters
the market at the beginning of a trend. The patterns occur
time and time again, thereby predicting the future. The
science of predicting the market by past trends is
remarkably :i.nvolvedand developed. ffhe information presented
in this pa.per constitutes the basic building blocks of
technical tools. There are many other tools used to fore-
cast either the trend of the market or the breakout from
a pattern (on the up-side or the down-side). 'l'hesefiner
measuring tools aTe designed to peer deeper into the daily
trading activity of the market. For example, the Market
Dispari.ty Index (rati.oof the Dow Average to that of Standard
and Poors 500 stock average) is an excellent forecaster of
fifteen to forty-five point market corrections. lo¥'hile
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such tools are a necessity for intermediate or long term
investors.
In short, the information provided in this paper
is more than ample to ena.bleone to successfully predict
market trends and corrections. You should now be able to
recognize resistance levels, consolidation movements,
trends, and also give a very accurate prognosis of future
developments. If you are surprised by the uncanny
accuracy of thi.smethod keep in mind that price and volume
movements result from the interplay of human beings, and
a human's actions are very difficult to predict. At the
same time, I know of no better tool than NPVI for recording
this interplay and giving a sense of direction to the
investor.
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FLUOR CORPORATION
(FLR-NYSE)
F~ecent Price: 21 Yo,
1972 Price Range 24-19
Dividend 5% Stock
Yield ·0·
• . Fiscal yeal- ends October 31.
*1970 Earns:
*1971 Earns:
$1.54**
$1.24'"
$0.75**
1970 PIE:
1971 PIE:
1972 PIE:
14.0x
17.4x
28.7x
, Est. 1972 Earns:
H _Primary earnings.
FUNDAMENTAL
Fluor, the world's largest engineer and constructor of petroleum processing facilities, stands to benefit
greatly from the next major surge in construction of petroleum refining and petrochemical products
plarit s.
Fluor's earnings have been in a steep downtrend because the petroleum industry has been understandably
reluctant to place orders for new refining facilities This situation arose as a result of uncertainties sur-
rounding (a) unleaded gasoline requirements (b) oil import allocations (c) construction of the Alyeska
(Alaska) Pipeline (dl ref inerv siting problems brought about by environmentalist objections (e) continued
postponements of East Louisiana offshore lease sales,
It is our opinion that by early 1973 many of these complex problems that are preventing the petroleum
refining industry from placing new orders now will be resolved and immediately foster a new round of
capaci tv building. This additional capacity will be sorely needed to meet the anticipated requirements
for the latter half of this decade,
Because of the long lead time involved in the construction of new or major processing installations,
orders would have to be placed no later than the early part of calendar 1973 to guarantee the new plants
coming on-stream in 1975 or early 1976. Fluor also stands to gain appreciable revenue from construction
of plants producing substitute natural gas from naptha, coal or crude petroleum. Other sources of incre-
mental earnings are contract drilling, civil engineering and certain other petroleum related activities.
l.astlv. Fluor has acquired interests in oil exploration concessions off the coasts of Greece, Taiwan, and
West Irian (I ndonesia),
Fluor's net income per share in the current fiscal year to end October 31,1972 may approximate $0.75
clown from $'1.24 in the year before.
Although the current outlook for earnings is dismal, the future appears very bright. We anticipate an
uptrend in earnings establishing itself sometime in fiscal 1973 with net income per share of $2-$3 as
real iz able objectives in fiscal years 1974-1975.
I
. _ FI " n outstanding speculation on the next upward swing in petroleum refinery
n our OpJrllOn uor IS a " " 'buildinq, Also, the develop;ng energy def;ot in this country" "'tensofY"'9 research effo'" in the gas
. ,. . . f I S cess 'In this area could also become an Incremental source of income to Fluor.
.ncanon 0 eoa. uc
~" T IS MERELY A CURRENT MARKET BULLETIN. INFORMATION AND STATiSTICAL
~~IS I:, NOT A SOLICITATION OF ANY ORDER TO BUY ORRC~~L~H~~H W'E BELIEVE TO BE RELIABLE BUT WHICH IN NO WAY ME GUARANTEED BY US_
TA l_o~nAINED IN THIS REPORT WERE PREPARED BY SOU o -
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f-'urcIla:;e of Fluor common stock for long term capital gains is recommended at current levels for specu-
lijt:'-Ie accounts.
Operating PIE
Year Ends Revenue Net Income (a) Earnings Ratio
October 31 (M~) (MM) % Sales Per Share Price Range High-Low
1972 E<;t. $435.0 $ S.7E 2.0E $0.75E 24-20* 3227*
1971 614.0 12.3 2.0 1.24 29-19 23-15
1970 513.4 14.7 2.9 1.54 31-16 20-10
1969 434.6 17.1 3.9 1.86 48-21 26-11
1968 373.9 15.3 4.1 1.75 52-20 30-12
1967 374.9 12.1 3.2 1.79 27-13 15- 7
(a) - Before extraordinary items in fiscal 1969 & 1967. • - To date.
TECHNICAL-
While near term action may appear temporarily uninspired, Fluor has worked its way to the narrow end
of its funnel-like trading range and should emerge from it shortly. The upside is favored at this time by
virtue of the constant support uncovered at these depressed levels. Support is substantial from here down
to the mid-teens. For practical purposes of limiting risks, however, a protective stop at 18 is suggested. A
move above 24 would be interpreted constructively and make operative measurements to the 32-34 area.
As the accompanying chart picture indicates, Fluor has been relatively quiet in a narrow band between 19
and 24 for the past six months. Recent action has placed it on the minus side of its moving average. At
the same time, however, this action constituted a successful test of the large and broad major support area
below 20.
Profiles of the tops and bottoms, dark lines on graph, show a strikinqlv similar resemblance to each other,
pointing lip once more the equivalence of its buying and selling pressures at this level.
(Chart Courtesy of R. W. Mansfield Co.)
April, 1972
ART:jc
ALEXIS R. TRAINA
Investment Research Department
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Teletype machine at Thomson & McKinnon, July 6, 1972
Heard on the Street·
deep in airline issues: "F'rom what 1 e,\11l
gather, F'ingerhut hasn't lost his taste tor
'American Airhnes. But I'll tel] you this, ur
bad known he WM lowering his esttrnate OTl
VAL, 1 rntght have lightened up somewhat on
my airline holdings." .
- Stephen Robert, Who runs the Oppenll~i- :
mer Fund, alsowas unavailable for comment. '
But he hall indicated in a prevlous convtttaa"
tton that he' doesn't •.Iways see eye to 4l)'f!
with Oppenheimer's reaearch department
Mr. Fingerhut did put out a recent IO.&~
commentary for Oppenhelme,r's Inst.itutlO~1I.1
clients in which he spelled out some of hi.
thoughts on the airline industry. The can;'
mentary, obtained from one of Oppenheimer s
ehents , is bullish in nature. In it, Mr. Finger.
hut, along with fellow analyst Robert ~.
Emerson, says; "We remain quite opumtauc
about industry fundamentals and consider the
current stock price weaknesa caused by the
contusion about traffic growth to be an oppor-
tune time to add to airline positions."
As for concern about teas-than-expected
traffic for the Memorial Day weekend, which
. affected May figures, the Oppenheimer com.
mentary notes that over the last 18 months
there has been a proltteratton of three- day
weekends throughout the year. Thus, it con.
. eludes, Memorial Day probably haa lost some
impol'tance as a vacation wee.kend. Where
there has been some talk that May tra(flc
rose only about 6% from year'earller levell!l,
Mr. Fingerhut thinks the gain, based on early
indications, wal! about 9.2'k,.
FUrther, Mr. Fingerhut projects SUmmer
traffic (June tlltilugh September) will rise
12'/( to HI';;'. from the comparable 1971 period.
And he dOl1lm't see any reason why June
Qhouldn't be within thill range. The analyst
says the critical near· term variable conUnues
to be traffic growth. "Ancl if we are correct
about the "ummel'," )le states,"airline secur.
Itles Would appear attracUve since they would
be favorably influenced by good Ilummer reo
IIUltS."
A Concern of airline analysts Is the rifle in
unit costs and dollar expense". But Mr. {<'In.
gerhut observes that 0( five carriers that reo
ported monthly e!ll'llings in April, only one
had higher dollar operating expense growth
thaI'! its first quarter rate of growth. As such,
the analyst concludes that expense growth,
WhIch has been running at II higher-than.an./
ticlpated level, doesn't Bcem to be accelerat.ing.
Domestic trunk line oper'ating expenses
rose 8% in the tint quarter of 1972. And Mr.
Fingel'hut believes that second quarter expen.
SCI! will be slightly lower than -the first qltacr.
-ter rate.
While Mr. It'ingerhut has shaved lIome
earnings estimates, he aillo Is ullderstood to
have raised some. notably on EIl.stern .\ir,
Hiles and National All'lInes. In the case ot
UAL, Oppenheimer had reported.ly IJeen elli'
mating as high &II $3 a share for 1972. In 1\.
reviSion, the brokerage house !lees a potentia]
tl1fure all low all $1.1lO a share for the yell!'.
By DAN DOIH'M.~~
It isn't any secret that Oppenheimer & CO,
H, probably (Inc ot the most powerful invest.
ment rorces 1lt'olmd where airline stocks are.
'..oncer ned.
The chief reason is that its airline analyst,
Ber t Fingerhut, is Widely respected In mutual
fund cil'cle!!. And when Mr'. Fingerhut decldes
1:<1 downgrade his earni{)gs estimates on any
Ilbrllne , as he has done recently on.Delta Air
Unes and ~iAr.... (pal'ent company 01 United
Alr Lil1es)., ,you can usually expect weakneeB
in the stock.! Involved. That'll precisely what
happened In b''lth C8.SNL
Recently, Oppenheimer figured in all mel-
~nt. which, accordtng to some observers,
Ull!y par·tlY explaf.f) the reason for additional
weakness in theairlilie stocks that followed
a.n earlier r'-:port that May traffic wasn't Lipto
eXpc!ltations. In fact. several money manag-
ers were qutck to denounce Oppenheimer for
whaf now appears to have been an erroneOlareason. .
l':l' brief, last 'I'uesday' a huge block pf
Arnl!~lcan 'AirJIf!e8 lilhange\J hands-4~2, 100
!!hare$ at !O% .. Salomon Brothers'handed the
trade. And Ilccording' to reliable sources, the
seller was the 0PPenheime" Fund. On the buy
»Ide, acei<)rdl,ng to reportll, were a number of
banks ana Insurance companies. In addition;
Saloml'n itself i:1I repQrted to have ~aken down
a big chUnk of the block in order to effect thetl'an~actlon.
'l'hllt tritdc shook up more than a few
money manager'S Since Oppenheimer, namely
Mr. l<'lngerhut, has been telling one and all
that It's stlll a bull on t~legroup.
Within the next day Or two, according to
reports cirCulated Oil Wall Street, Mr. Fingel':'-'
hut shaved his eStimates on Americll,tl Air::-jines' aamil1g-s,
This rai~ed the immediate cry of "foul
pllty" in one mutUal fund organization. an Op.
penhelmer client with a faIr'Sized position in
the stOCk, More trnpor'tant was the questIon of
whether Opp()nhe!lner was beginning to have
second thoughts about its bullish stance on
the group.
Mr. Flng-c}'hut wa~n't available for com.
ment yi)sterday. ,But accordIng to one money
lrllmage~' who .,polte with him, the Oppenhei.
mer ane.IYl!t hasn't chopped his estimate on
American. And Mr. F'tngerhut l'IltIOi8 said to
' n.ll.vl? told the fun(l that he', "till fa,vorably in-
Clined toward .the Industry.
However, Mr, Fingerhut Is !laid to have cut
his earnings estimate on UAL shortly after
the big block trade on American Airlines. The.I lock ot UAL fell 3~ last Wednesday on morethan 300,000 sAal·ell.
I
Alld here, the Oppenheimer actiO,n has
raised a question.
AI! one source pu-w it: "The airlines are Ii
tlornogenous group. When you question the
l' ~1I..rnings reliability of one large concern, you
qlit&l!tion the relIability ot every other major
Iltrl1ne, all well, Ftngerhut's impact is huge.
A.ll.dif he tlJrns on one, who's to say he WOlI't
nRn on anothel"" .
f Says allother client of Oppenheimer knee.
ft~-tI
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Heard on the Street j
company was "seriously constdertng ' an eq. 1"
ulty offering,
How come the change In less than a.
month'?
Mr. Kedllon explained yesterday that eer-
ratn ot the company's key markets, nota'blf
electronic watches and automotive Illectrcm-
IClI, prOductl allloclated with brakes and ""
belts, were 'developing strenger than anUe~'
pale.d. Thill Indicated, Mr. Kedson lIayll\ ".
quicker need for financing."
He adds that the company didn't actually
crystallize' ItII thinking on an equity offering
until a few week!! ago. However, one informed
source 8ayl he heard In late May, from an-
other brokerage house, that R, W. Preseprtch
'·Co. would be handling an equity offering tor
BoUd 8tate. '
Such information, at least on a conttrrned
basis, hasn't yet been made public.
Mr. Kedson does confirm it when asked.
"If we go ~hrough with H--and It lookS like we
wtll-we'U file aomeume In July," he says.
Further, he contirms that "we're dillcus81ng It
with PreS8prlch." Mr. Kedson es,tlinate8 the
tinandng wUl be in the $3 mUllon to $Ii million
~ea, a<iding l'Qughly 200,000 8hares to the ap-
proximately HO,OOO «harell OUtstanding, SoUd
State recently completed a one-tor· tour reo
verse apllt, which brought the nwnber of
shares 9utatanding down to the current level.
Value Line's Mr. Hillson did do Another
chec~ with Solid State in early June prior to
the tlnal Wl'lte-up of the company, But he says
there wall.n't any indication to him at the tlme
of any change in the company'. thhtltlng to·
ward an equity offering. He also IIIliys he
didn't attend the shareholden' meeting; thUll,
he didn't know about the company's change In
heart wwerd an equity offering.
In V41ue Line'li write-up of Solid I3tate, the
service foreealt 1972 earnings, tax·free due to
iI. lIub"t.anttal tax-lOllS carryforward, of about
70 cents a IIhare. 'thia compare8 wlth'a year.
earlier 10sIIof about $800,000. In the flrat qual"
tel', SoUd State earned $9.,000, pretax, com-
pared with a year-earlier 1088 of $209,000.
Mr" Ked80n !!Ayathe PFOSpects of an offer"
Ing prohibit him from commenting on the
Value Line write-up. But one informed !!ource
privy to management'll thinking declares: "If
I had written it, It wouldn't have been 80 bull.
Ish . , , with 110 ma"y glowing adjectives.;
also, 60 cents a IIhare (tax·tree) til more rea-
Bonable."
By DAN DOHrMAN
A bll.llillh report. especially one by a lead-
itIt' advisory eervtee, can frequently work
wOIadera tor It stock.
'tllke, tor example, SoUd State Scientific
(over··the·counter), II. company with tour loss
years In a row and II. negatlve net worth of
.l>r,J\lt $400,000.
Wtth II. record lik.e tha,t,),ou might think
twt~ about bUYing such a securtty.
ffowever, the company II In the semtcon-
ductor field, rated by Wall Street as II. hot in-
vestment area. And after looking the situation
over, 'Value Line, an lnt1u.enUaI Investment
adviser, put out 8 glOWing btly recommenda_
tion on the stock on June ~3 when the bid
price was 13. Wttltln a wee~ or so, the share •.
zoomed to about 21 bld._a -purt of more than
60%, '
Not mentioned In that report was what
some observer!!, including a· key cUent of
Value Line, vIew as an important om1asion-
i the pqsslbHtty of a stock offering, which of
courae would dilute per-share earnings,
.There also"were reports that several ana-
IYllts at. Value Line had bought SoUd State SCI:
-entitlc'. stock before the Value Line recom-
mendation caml) out. Further, there were ru-
mors that one or mo.re of the 'fund8 Valu~
Line manages may have bolJ#ht the stock I,tl
advance of the bulUtlh report. However Ar-
nold Bernhard, head of the Val)!e Line' aer-
vice, dented thM any at the servlce'8 funds'
had !:)ought the I!tock.
As tar as the analy.~ are concerned, Eric
Aiken, executive editor of Value Llne'!!'Selec.
Uon I: Opinion, the Invelltment pubUcatiol)
that carded the report on Solid State, say. he
undcretands that "twt! or three analysts did
buy the stock" prior to the recommendation.
He explains that the reaaOn this 'waan't reo
p,or~d In tbe Value LIne commentary on the
semiconductor maker Wea that none of the
e,nalyst8' pUrCMllell bad eOlltmore than P,OOO.
He Ildt15 that this' !'fln' Hne with a Value
Line rule. In addition, Mr, Aiken lIays, the
service h8.8 a regulation calling for It. ana-
IYllt8to hold onto an unlisted .tOCKfor a mini-
mum of five months after a recommendation_
In Ule cue of a !lilted allCurlty, the analyst I.
locked I.nto the purchase for three monthll,
But wbat about t.he c»QI.. ion of the p08sl-
ble stock offering In the write-up?
DaVid HIIIaon, 8.. Value Line analYllt who
wrote, up the company, lIayo that when he
went to speak to two top oltioers of Solid State
late In AprU, he wu Jnformed that "It had
cI'08l!ed their mind." But be WIUI auured, he
sayl!l, that there weren't any planll In the off.
~. Mr. Hillson aillo starN that the two Bol1d
~.e ofticen, Henry Bore41l1, chairman, and
~ard Ked80n, president. advised h.lm that
ibe tompany had I!lufflclent capital on haud-.
lIIaod on the fecent completion of a revolVlnB'
oA>Clit agreement with Flr8t Pennsylvania
Bank--to take care of capital requJrements
tGr the time being.
But h~811than a month later. on May n,
_lid State'", annUAl meeting wu told the
A top speclallllt on the .emlconductor in-
dUlltry observes that Solid State'!! major
thrullt is In electronic watch ct.rcultry. Suthe
warns that competition III intenalfying greatly
With BCA, 8. ,major partiCipant, ~tepplng up
Its ettorts: 0.110, Motorola Is making II major
effort In the area, a8 well all SclUron DevlCflIl
(American) and In&enll (over-the.countti"'."
"Thel'e IlIn't anything ... unique about SOtttl
State," he uaerta. "All it hu Is a little ~~
time ... , which may 800n disappear. It I
owned the stock at current levels, t"d be co","
cerned." The Issue WQl quoted late yesterct..y
at 17~ bid. That's a prlce·earnlng~ mult1pl~.
balled on fully taxable net, of about :ill tlln ...
Value Line's el!ltimate of 1972 CIlJ,·ningll.
149
APPENDIX E 150
NEEEIA ~RIC~ VOLU~E INDEX
DArl~ CLOSE .•/.i1;EhLY
..'/ CdANGE VOLUlvd": .?RI CE
CUMULA'rI VE
/"
OF' CHANGE I!~ Cr~ FOn. THE
VOLUME P~1.1 Cr.: VOLUNE
-- "'J'_"_"__
DJIA DJIA DJIA 1;lF~EK DItF£~d.EbiCE
INDEX
~~.....-,_. ..---------
19(,7
L.EC1I22 887a.J7 52,320
:~9 905.11 17.74 .01999 48,900 '7.7':J
5,009.'79
1 S/F,f3
JAN. 5 901.2i1 -·j.(37 .00428 49,060
-20.~S, 4, jI/)8. o O
12 .:l98.98 -2.26 .00251 65,950 -16.55
4,Si72.~~5
19 eeo.52 -18.66 .02076 63,690
-152.~?2 2+,840.0)
26 365.06 -15.26 .01733 54,640 -:14.6Si
4,745.51+
F-r-r ,'_._ 2 bS3.56 1. 50 .00173 50,280 8.70
'+,756.64
L, ;~;.
-.
) ti2~(j. 04 -C:j.5~2 .02724- 47,4L+0 -129.25
4,607.41
16 e,:~6..jl~ - 5.70 .00440 41,030 - 18.05 4,509.)6
2j d49.dO 13.46 .01609 54,040 54.'n
4,62+4.13
i
~;A:<. 1 cAO.24-4 - ':.i, 36 .01101 j~. T(O
/+).19 4,600.34 I- ~I
8 b.:\5.;::I/+ - 5.20 .00619 47,9~0 - 29.71
4,570.65
1r: 857 •5~) - 2.)1 .00277 50,640 - 11+. OJ
4,556.60
?
22 e26.05 -11.50 • 01j7 3 44,060 -
60.49 4,4~l6.11
29 3/+0.67 11+.62
.017'70 )4-1,410 7:5.jO 4,S69.L+1
.lip:~•
,... 365.31 25.14 .02990 '/8,2l-80
;~j4.66 /+,804.07
J )05 r.;c.. j9.88 .04606 47,660 219.52
5,0::25.59
11 . ,~, ,/
1° 397. (5 - 8.0/+ .00888 74,460
66.12 4·,S!57.47
.7
-;:_.(~j 906.G3 8.58 .00934 68,560
64.04 5,021.51
1v:AY 3 S.19.~?1 15.18 .01/+55
73,070 106.':>2 5,127.83
10 91;;:.01 - 6.)0 .00685
63,800 - 1+3.70 5,084.13
17 89tL 98 -13.93
.01526 65,060 - 96.2) 4,~87.90
r"j)l b95.28 - j.70 .00
1+12 67,760 - 27.92 4,95';J.~8
co -t .00416 53,780 22.57 4,9[;,2.)5
.:51 C9S1.00 ).72
JllN' rr )I14.i~8 15.BB .01766 82,060
144.92 5,127.2:7
, 1," ( .00138 66,jt~0 9.16 5,11b.ll
IJ!f 913.62 - 1.26~12.69 .01589 55,970 - T7.74
5,ohO.37
~~1 SiOO.9) .00:)+7 :12 , ')60 - 18.j[) ::;.0':::1. )928 897. :20 - j.Ll
151
,.J1)l,'{ J )lCU.51 5.71 .006.)6 39,020
24.82 5,046.81
12 9;~2.1-1-6 18.95 .02097 68,500 143.64
:5,1S10..45
19 913.92 ~ E3.9+ ~00926 58,850 - 54.50
5,135.95
26 838.4"{ -25.45 .02785 54,950 -153.04
4;0982.91
!llV}. 2 tY{1$27 ~-17.20 ..019,6 45,440 - 87.97
4,894.94
9 869.65 - 1..62 .00186 39,810
7.1\-0 4,887.54
_.f ':.Jt55.c):1 16.24 .01867 L+~, :j20 85.:>5
4,973.09
J_:
2 ;~ ()92.34 6.1t:5 .00728 45,590 33.19
5,006.28
30 896. OJ. 3.67 .00411 38,590
15.86 5,022.14
~:H~PT.6 921.25 25.24- .02817 44,850
126.34 5,148.45
13 917.21 - h.04 .00439 51,040 - 22.41
5,126.07
20 924.42 7.21 .00786 59,310
46.61 5,172.68
~~7 935.80 9.38 .01015 59,570
60.46 5,233.14
o ell' . 4 952.95 19.15 .02051 65,660
134.67 5,367.81
11 91+9.59 - 3.36 .00353 56,090 - 19.80
5,348.01
'"'f O 967.49 17.90 .01885 61,600 116.12
5,464.13
.1. c)
25 961.28 - 6.21 .006'+2 60,530 -
38.86 5,425.27
NOV. I 948.41 -12. wr .01339 56,240 - 75.31
5,.349.96
8 951'3.98 10.57 .01114 49,530
55.18 5,405.14
15 :j65.88 6.90 .00720 62,880
45.27 5,450•41
22 967.06 1.18 .00122 6.3,290
7.72 5,1+53.13
29 Sid5. oE3 18.02 .01863 61,800
115.13 5,573.26
DEC. 6 978.24 - 6.84 .00694 65,9tO -
45.43 5,527.78
13 980.29 2.05 .00236 64,300
10.34 5,558.12
20 966.99 -13.30 .01
1+57 66,210 - 96.47 5,1.~51.65
2" 952.51 -14.48 .01i+97 45,1HO
- 67.98 5,383.67
~I
1~69 .62
JAN. J 951.89 .00065
47,790 3.11 5,380.56
_)
10 025.~)3 -26.56 .02769
67,120 -185.86 5,1911-.70
17 93S.5'-t 10.01 .01082
58,.580 63.1'7 5,257.87
2L+ 938.59 3.05 .00326
59,030 19.24- 5,27'7.11
jl ;A6.05 '(.2t6 .00795
59,590 /+7.37 5,324.48
P,EI3. 7 947.85 1.80
..00190 49,Lj.50 12.19 5,336.67
14 951.95 4.10 .00433
46,170 20.49 5,)57.16
21 916.65 -35.50 .03'708
50,190 -168.86 5,1b8.30
28 905.21 -11.44 .01248
::,),260 - 66.47 5,121.8)
MAR. rr 911. H3 5.97
.00660 49,450 52. 6.L~ 5,19+.4·7
Ih 904.28 - 6.90 .007'5'7
46,170 - 34.95 5,119.52
2l ~20. 00 15.72
.01738 50,190 87.23 5,206.75
28 ':)35.48 15.48
.01683 55,290 <:)9.69 5,296.1.t4
APPE1TDIX E (cont inued) 152
/l£-'i-( ,. ~' '';127.50 8.18 .00874- 32.7bO 28.65 5,267.79
1J. Slj3.46 6.16 .00664 54,170 55."}7 5,,_,03.76
.L:~ 924.[32 8.64 .00926 48,490 44.90 r.:; 2,--0 86- - :), :)0 •25 9211.00 .82 .00089 56,300 - 5.01 5,25j.85
MAY 2 957.17 33.17 .03590 72,670 260.89 5,514.'13
9 961.61 4.44 .00464 67,610 31.37 5,546.1016 967.30 5.69 .C0592 62,030 36.72 5,582.822.3 947.L1-5 -19.85 .02052 56, '780 -116.51 5,466.3129 937 • .q4 ..-10.01 .0105'7 42,710 - 4-5.14- 5,421.1'7
.TUNE 6 924.1'7 -12.6'7 .01352 56,080 - 75.82 5,345.3513 894.84- -29.93 .0)236 59,810 -193.55 5,151.8020 876.16 -18.68 .02088 56,460 -117.89 5,033.912'"{ 867.'(6 - 8.40 .00959 54,180 - 5 r. 96 4,981.95
JULY .3 885.7'3 17.97 .02071 39,990 82.82 5,061.1-. TI11 852.25 -5.3.48 .03780 51,790 -195.77 4,869.0018 845.92,: - 6.33 .00743 48,9.30 - 36.55 4,832.6525 818.06 -27.86 .03293. 41,010 -135.05 L~,6'j7.60
l:'" U:1 • 1 826.59 8.53 .01043 70,240 7.3.26 4,770.868 ~j24.46 - 2.1) .00258 48,979 - 12.64 4,'758.2215 '~20.88 - 3.58 .004.3'... 44,385 19.27 4,738.95-22 837.25 16.37 .01994 50,503 100.jO 2+,658.6529 ~~.56.72 .53 .00063 43,025 - 2.71 4,6)5.94
~;.'pT.5 e19.50 -17.22 .02058 35,590 - 73.24 4,562.70.~ L_ 12 B24.25 '+.75 .00580 53,950 51.29 4,59.3.9919 830.j9 6.14 .00745 56,260 41.91 ./t,635.90
2f) 824«18 - 6.21 .00748 54,000 4().59 L+,~)95.51-
()cr. ~i( :)on .41 -15.77 .0L.Jl.5 52,280 -100.01 4,1+Si5.50./ :~c6.96 1.45 .001?SI10 _. :,2,2jO 9.)5 4,4iJ6.1517 tJ36.o6 29.10 .03606 82,550 2':J7.68 ':t, r(8 j. 8:;
24 362 .~:t 26.20 .03134 79,530 24'9.25 5,0j5.0851 i3~~~.Si9 - 6.27 .00727 (;2,870 45.71 4-, ')87.Y(-
NOV. 7 ,::60.J-+8 )+.49 .00525 59, "}8Ci .51.lt·SJ 5,018.86
11+ 8it 9.26 -11. 22 .01j04 57,720 - '(5.~?7 5,Ou).5921 82).13 -26.13 .03077 54,220 -166.8.3 4,8)6.7628 812.30 -10.83 .01316 41,680 - 54.85 1+,781.91
DEC. 5 793.03 -19.27 .02372 55,570 -lj1.01 4,65u.1012 7')6.69 - 6.34 .00799 56,Sl54 45.50 4, 60/~. 6019 '(159.86 3.17 .00/+03 f)7,1~jO 27.08 £+,631.682(; ,{()7.(5 7.79 .00986 45,0(J0 44.37 4,6(6.05
APPENDIXE (continued) 153
lSi'to
-:3IJ9.20 .01448 55,510 dO.38 4.756.45JA.N. 2 11.55
9 798.11 -11,.09 .01370 53,010 - 72.62 4,68.3.8116 782.60 -15.51 .01943 58,218 - 113.12 4,570.69
") I, T(~).54 - r(•06 .00902 52,511 - 47.36 4,52j.33c:.__, 4,298.10jO 74l~.06 --51.48 .04·059 55,340 - 224.65
.EB. 6 752.77 8.71 .01171 61,140 71.59 4,370.2913 753.30 .53 .00010 54,270 j.80 4,374.09
20 '757.46 ·4.16 .00552 55,550 .30.66 4,404.75
27 Tt7.59 20.13 .02658 48,450 128.78 4,5j3.5j
(,84.12 6.53 .00840 58,170 48.86 4,58~~.397'72.11 -12.01 .01532 47.110 - 72.17 4,510.2220 763.66 - 8.45 .01094 44,630 - 48.85 4,461 •.3926 791. 05 27.39 .03587 1+5,020 161.49 l~,622.88
pc'\.. ) 7Si1.78 .73 .00092 48,2)5 44.38 4,578.50
~ J. 10 790.46 - 1.32 .00167 45,020 7.52 4,570.9817 775.94 -11+.52 .01837 50,321 92.44 Lt, 478.54
24- 747.43 -28.51 .03674 49,010 - 180.06 4,298.48
lAY 1 733.63 -15.80 .01846 63,580 - 117.37 4,181.118 717.73 -15.90 .02167 52,890 - 114.61 4,066.5015 "(02.22 -15.51 •02161 56,'740 - 122.62 3,943.8822 662.17 -40.05 .05703 5~,680 - 340.56 3,60.3.5229 700.'-14 38.2? .OSrr79 80,690 466.51 4,069.83
liUNE 5 695.03 - 5.41 .00772 71,960 55.55 4,014.2812 684.21 -10.82 .01557 38,::;192 - 60.71 3,953.51151 '720.43 36.22 .05028 47,970 241.19 4,194.762f) 637.84 -52.59 .04524 49,469 - 223.80 5,970.96
ULY 2 6~j9.1LI 1..30 .00189 j5,134 6.64 5,977.60
10 700.10 10.96 .01590 5.3.781 85.51 4,06.3.1117 '735.08 3)+.93 .049[39 11-9,753 248.20 4,311.31
24 7jO.08 - 5.00 .00680 56,070 58.13 4,2'73.18
.51 754.12 4.09 .00560 51,195 28.66 4,501.84
'7 725.70 - 8.42 .011'+7 40,571 - 46.55 4,2:55.jlAUG-.
JA 710.84, -lit-S6 .02048 38,875 - r(SJ.61 4,175.7021 7L+5.41 34.57 .04863 4Si,5160 24.2.96 l+,418.6628 765.81 20.40 .02737 78,670 215.32 4,6.)j.~8
SEPT. !.~ 1"(1.15 5.34 .00697 60,591 1+2.O~ 4 c7h r-,'_ \).07
:11, 761.B4 - S1. :51 .01207 5'7,431 69.32 4,606.'(5l~ 758.Lt9 -1~~•66 .CJ1662 65,277 - 108.50 4,4S18.25\/ .5.23 .004j2 82t , L~~~2 j6.472C: 761.77 1+ L)j4 "t):J , • • t:;
APPENDIX E (continued) 15a
OClr .. 2 766~16 4.39 .00576
72,245 41.62 4,576.34
9 768.69 2.53 .00329
84,132 27.68 L~, 604. 02
16 763.35 - 5.34 .00695
50,561 - 35.14 4,568.88
2~1 '759.38 - 3.97 .00520 51,151
- 26.60 4 t 5'+2.28
30 755.61 - 3.77 .00496 50.,524 -
25.06 4,517.22
NOV. 6 771.9'7 16.36 .02165
54,196 177.34 4,694.56
13 759.79 -12.18 .01578
60,874 - 96.05 4,598.51
20 761.57 1.78 .00234
48,702 11.40 4,609 ..91
27 781.35 19.78 .02597
48,903 126.99 4,736.90
D®C. 4 816.06 34.71 .04442
92,282 409.91 5,146.81
11 825.92 9.86 .01208
7:;,890 89.26 5,236.07
18 822. rt - 3.15 .00}81 69,503
_26.48 5,209.59
2~j. 828.38 5.61 .00682 50,.goo
34.71 5,244.30
31 838.92 15.54 .01272 62,588
79.61 5,323.91
1971
JAN. 8 837.08 - 1.84 .00219 70,129 -
15.36 5,308.55
15 845.70 8.62 .01030
87,227 89.85 5,398.40
22 861.31 15.61 .01846 90,502
166.69 5,565.09
29 868.43 7.12 .00827 100,9l2
83.45 5,648.54
J:."EB. 5 876.57 8.14 .00937
105,711 99.05 5,747.59
12 888.83 12.26 .01399 110,616
154.76 5,902.35
19 878.56 -10.27 .01155
74,59'-, - 86.16 5,$16.19
26 878.83 .27 .00031 80,336
2.49 5,818.68
~lAH. 5 898.00 19.17 .02181
82,358 179.63 5,998.31
12 898.34 .34 .000}8
91,576 3.48 6,001.79
19 912.92 14.58 .01623
91,341 148.24 6,150.03
26 903.48 - 9.44 .01034 77,989
- 80.64 6,069.39
APR. r, 903.04 )....70 .00520
74,705 38.85 6,108.24
c:
9 9~Q. 39 17.55 .01921
75,887 145.18 6,254•02
16 ~)40.21 19.82 ..O215}
102,f-396 221.54 6,475 ..56
23 94'7.79 7.58 .00806}
92,091 74.22 6,54.9.78
30 941.75 ,- 6.04 .00637
102,781 - 65.47 6,484.31
MAY '1 936..97 - 4.'78
.00508 86,486 _ 45.94 6,440.37
14 936.06 - .•91 .00097
79,801 - 7.74 6,4·32.63
21 921.87 -14.19
.01516 70,792 -107.32 6,;125.31
28 907' .ai ...14.06 .01549
66,066 -102.34 6,222.97
JUNE: 4 Y22.15 14.34
.01S80 62,876 99.35 6.322.52
11 916.47 - 5.68 .00616 66,386 -
40.90 6,281.42
18 889.16 -27.31
.02980 68 t 2tjj -203.92 6. O'T?~50
25 (376.68 -12.48
.01404 66,278 - 93.06 5,98
Lf. 44
APPENDIX E (continued) 155,
,rOLY 2 390.19 13.51 .01541 62.723
96.65 6,081.09
0 901•.80 11.61 .01304 51,5
08 67.17 6,148 ..23
.,/
'1 r aS8.51 -13.29 .01474
66,912 - 98.63 6,049.60- )23 887,,78 .73 .00Q82 60,545 -
41099 6,044.61
30 858.43 -29.35 •033.06 62,~96
-208.29 5,836.32
AUG .. 6 850.61 - 7.82 .00911
62,410 - 56.86 5,779.46
13 858.28 7.67 .00902 54,830
49.46 5,828.92
20 880.,1. 22.63 .026')1 105,290
277.65 6,106.57
(~'7 908.15 27.24 .03092 76,550
236.69 6,343.26
SEPT.) 912...68 4.5' .00499
57,064 28,.4'"{ 6.371.7.3
10 911.00 - 1.62 .00177 58,487 - 10.35
6,361.38
17 908.22 - 2.78 .00305
54,068 - 16.49 6,}44.89
24 889.31 -18.91 .02082 61,173
127.36 6,217.53
OCT' • 1 893.98 4 ..67 .00525 56,965
29.91 6,247.44
8 893.91 .07 .00008 74,221
.59 6,236.85
15 874.85 -19.06 .02132 61,686
-131.52 6,115.33
22 852.37 -22.48 .02570 6,,}63
...178.25 5,937.08
29 839.00 -13.37 .01569 61,47
0 - 96.44 5,840.64 fl
NOV. 5 840.39 1.39 .00166
65,438 10.86 5,851.50
12 812.94 -27.45 .03266 61,862
-202.0} 5,649.47
19 810.67 - 2.27 .00279 60,957 - 17.00
5,6}2.47
26 816.59 5.92 .00730 50,9
44 37.)..9 5,669.66
DEC. 3 859.59 4·3.00 .05266
92,816 488.79 6,158.45
10 856~75 - 2 ..84 .00330 81,607 - 26.93
6,131.52
17 873.80 17.05 .01990
89,)33 117.77 6,309.29
23 881.17 7.37 .00843
79,228 66.79 6,376.08
31 890.20 9.03 .01025
71,993 7j.79 6,449.87
1912 .02266
JAN. 7 910.37 20.17
87,)73 197.98 6,647.85
14 906.68 - 3.69 .00405 85,641 -
34.68 6,613.17
21 907.44 .76
.00084 9}+,767 7.96 6,621.13
28 906838 - 1.06 .00177
9),494 - 10.94 6,610.19
FEB. 4 902.62 .30
.00033 99,702 3.29 6,613.48
11 917.59 10.91
.01209 95,507 115.47 6,728.95
18 917.52 •07
.00008 93,217 .75 6,728.20
25 922.79 5.27
.00574 67,6j9 58.83
6,767&03
I
,1(
III
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156
I " , 942.43 19.64 .02128 104,822 22_).06 6,99().O9, .:._h[{ • _)
lU 959..87 - 2.56 .00272 106,102 - 28.8 .. 6,Si(1.2)
1~( 942.88 3.01 .00320 91,.501 2( :')':) 6,:?SJO.45./ t:. J. •
24 ~;Jlt2. 8 .60 .00064 84,~!91 5 '9 6,985.0630 940.70 - 1.58 .00168 55,80.5 9 7 6,9~(5.69
Ai+(' '"( 962.60 21.90 .02.528 98,814 230.01 7,2()S.'(014 9rs7.72 5.12 .00532 99,534 52.95 7,256.bS
~~1 963.£30 _. 3.92 .002+05 9u,)7) - 36.60 7,222.01)2e 95!~.17 - 9.63 .(;0999 79,.510 - 79.23 7.142.f32
L.r~·'.( 5 ~41.2.5 ,-12 ..94 • C)l356 '72,177 - 97.88 7, 04Lt. 94-, ') ()4L 83 .60 .000(,Lt 71,94-2 4.60 7.049.54-J.-
" r ~f;l. 51+ 1s;.71 .020';)3 'n ,21+6 16j.78 7 ?l') .52.1. ;J ~.71 ,- ....2J 1'-'1 ;)c: .01010 1)2, ')29 83.36 7,296.68'),.~.< __;
2 961. Y;; - ).0G • ()lO15 t.'" _)67 - 62 .2~ 7,234.59JUNt.: 9j~1-.1+5 -26.~4 .02802 r( 1,260 -199.6'7 7,0.54.72k ~;
l!
10 ')1j.5.06 10.61 .01155 (~{,:?79 (.)7 ..82 7,122.54
If
~
